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 The importance of PTAs in today’s global economic order is unmistakable, 
especially during the last fifteen years when their proliferation has dramatically 
accelerated and their scope and structure have radically changed.  However, the available 
theoretical framework (international trade theories) from which their developmental 
impact is assessed seems to be largely lagging behind.  Hence, there is a crucial need for 
more realistic assessments of their embedded developmental features because an 
increasing number of developing countries are perceiving these agreements as one of the 
key instruments to propel their long delayed economic development.  In this thesis, I 
strive to construct an alternative theoretical framework that can better adapt to current 
PTAs’ structures, allowing a more realistic assessment of their economic impact on 
developing countries.  By following this alternative approach, I comparatively assess the 
development drive of two of today’s most important PTAs, namely NAFTA and ASEAN.  
The main conclusion echoes an increasing literature that warns developing countries from 
engaging in “reciprocal” North-South PTAs, but at the same time, encourages them to 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The importance of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs)1 in today’s world trade 
patterns is unmistakable.  About half of total global trade is now taking place within 
actual or prospective PTAs.  In the case of the Western Hemisphere, for example, by the 
year 2004 some 86% of total trade will be free of duty as the result of the implementation 
of those PTAs already in effect.  This does not take into account the future impact of the 
new agreements currently under negotiation (Majluf, 2004).  Although PTAs have been 
an important part of the international economic maneuvering of many countries for quite 
some time, after the ‘90s, their proliferation has dramatically accelerated (see figure I.1), 
and their structures radically changed to include more trade and “non-trade” related 
aspects and to increase the number of members involved.2
Figure I.1. PTAs Proliferation 
 














































    Source: World Trade Organization (2008)  
                                                 
1 According to Bela Balassa (1961), PTAs are the weakest and initial form of economic integration 
succeeded by Free Trade Areas, Custom Unions, Common Markets, and Economic Unions.  Trade 
literature refers to PTAs in other ways such as, Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) and Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs).  For simplicity and coherence, all throughout this thesis, I will refer to them as PTAs.  
Distinction will be made when necessary.  See Panagariya (1998) for further discussion. 
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2 See Crawford and Fiorentino (2005) for a more detailed discussion on PTAs’ current trends.  
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The initial formation of PTAs, as we know them today,3 was led by Western 
Europe and dates back to the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) in 1951, which was later enlarged and complemented to become what we know 
today as the European Union (EU).  European success was immediately associated with 
the idea that economic regional integration was strongly correlated with economic growth 
and prosperity, but little attention was paid to how such success was accomplished.   
Eventually, during the ‘60s, dozens of trade schemes, trying to mirror the 
European experience, emerged in Africa and Latin America.  These alliances covered all 
five levels of integration set out by Bela Balassa (1961).4  But unlike the EEC in Europe 
that flourished tremendously and expanded through the years, the replicas in Africa and 
Latin America either missed their deadlines rapidly, collapsed completely (or almost 
completely), or simply stagnated (Langhammer, 1992).   
This initial wave of PTAs in Africa and Latin America has been recorded in 
economic history as “Closed/Old Regionalism”, and “Shallow Integration” has been 
recognized as its main cause for failure, which included problems that follow: i) Import-
Substitution-Industrialization that only created inward-looking and protectionist policies, 
which lead to trade diversion; ii) the arrangements only involved developing countries 
(DCs) that lack strong economic foundations, capital, and an industrial base to sustain 
trade among themselves; iii) individual countries never fully committed to the integration 
process quickly dissolving the driving mode of the accords; and iv) all the schemes did 
 
3 Note that some form of preferential trade (North-South) took place during the colonial period between 
colonizers and their colonies; however, discussing this system is out of the scope of this research.  For 
further discussion on this topic see Mitchener and Weidenmier (2008).  
 
4 PTAs, Free Trade Areas, Custom Unions, Common Markets, and Economic Unions.  
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not have any credible enforcement mechanism of the rules initially implemented, 
enabling the commitment to vanish with time (Langhammer, 1992).   
This disappointing experience of PTAs among DCs put off some of the initial 
momentum of regional integration, leaving the practice mainly restricted to Europe.  
However, as UNCTAD (2007b) explains, following the failure of international financial 
institutions to manage the financial shocks towards the end of the ‘90s, and given the 
slow progress of multilateral trade negotiations, regionalism was reborn, generating an 
even stronger second proliferation wave5 and assuming a more than ever prominent place 
in the international development agenda.   
Unlike the initial closed/old regionalism that mainly focused on the reduction of 
trade barriers among members (shallow-integration), this “New Regionalism” – as it is 
often referred to in literature – arrived with a whole new philosophy, embracing the 
concept of ”Deep Integration”.  Deep integration has emerged as the underlying principle 
of most of the current PTAs, prompting DCs to steer economic policies towards 
integration into global markets and to harmonize their economic institutions, laws, and 
regulations around a narrow but universal set of benchmarks of strong property rights, 
open markets, and good governance.  Regardless of the “readiness” of the internal 
economic environment of each country, the following of this path has been presented as 
the best (and on some counts the only) way to ensure that the incentives and resources 
generated by global markets will support and sustain growth and development at the local 
level (UNCTAD, 2007b).  
 
5 Some authors such as, Pomfret (2005) and Majluf (2004) have identified a third wave of regionalism, 
starting during the last part of the ‘90s, which is characterized by its supra-regional scope.  For the purpose 
of this research, since the PTAs included here fall under the second wave of proliferation, this third wave 
will not be discussed.  For further details see the above authors.   
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Based on this rationale, new regionalism PTAs are taking a multi-tracked 
approach to economic integration, expanding the trade areas and sectors dealt with in the 
accord, as well as including many other non-trade related issues.  They go from a 
straightforward trade agreement on goods and services to broader agreements as part of a 
general economic partnership.  They involve issues such as investment, government 
procurement, environmental standards, labor standards, competition policy, and 
intellectual property rights (IPR) that were never addressed before in “trade” talks.   
There are different interpretations regarding the general driving force behind this 
process,6 but as far as DCs are concerned, the overarching motive is the search for 
effective policy instruments to achieve sustainable development through the insertion of 
national economies into the globalization process.  Also, a certain “domino effect”7 has 
been playing an important role in propelling this trend, with countries increasingly 
engaging in new PTAs as a means of counteracting perceived negative effects of 
discrimination and marginalization as other countries form PTAs (Majluf, 2004).  In a 
way, as UNCTAD (2007b) explains, new regionalism reflects the tendency to perceive 
globalization as a process whereby access to markets of the North and attracting foreign 
investment is key to successful integration of DCs into the world economy.   
Indeed, North-South PTAs (N-S PTAs) are the novel contribution of this new era 
of economic integration, arguing that DCs can greatly benefit from partnering with 
northern countries.  But this new regionalism not only promises economic prosperity 
under N-S PTAs, it also ventures into assuring that, to a certain extent, some South-South 
 
6 See for example, Sampson and Woolcock, 2003; and Okamoto, 2003 (in Majluf, 2004). 
  
7 The “Domino Effect” concept is largely attributed to Richard Baldwin (see Baldwin, 1993a).   
PTAs (S-S PTAs) might enhance economic development if deep integration is embraced, 
unlike S-S PTAs from the ‘60s that only embraced shallow integration.  Thus, these 
popular development promises of new PTAs have enticed many DCs to seek closer 
integration (even if only partially) and propel their economic development by partnering 
with both northern and southern countries.  In fact, this tendency is clearly reflected by 
their active participation in about 50% of current PTAs (figure I.2). 
Figure I.2. PTAs by Type of Partner. 
   
    Source: Crawford and Fiorentino (2005).  
 
 
Nonetheless, despite the energetic involvement of DCs in these new PTAs, there 
are still many “questions” about the goods and harms that they can bring to the 
development process, since they tend to largely deviate from any theoretical predictions.  
However, it is essential to note that most of the analysis on PTAs today is based on a 
theoretical framework that is greatly behind their current structural evolution, thereby 
falling far short from capturing and interpreting their actual outcomes.  This is mainly 
because, historically, trade has been the primary focus of PTAs (i.e. old regionalism) and 
also of their study.  Consequently, current PTA analysis is mostly derived from 
traditional trade theories and orthodox static economic analysis, which delimits any 
assessment to the welfare-trade-effects that can result from a certain PTA.     
But as mentioned before, current PTAs go far beyond trade matters, making the 
current theoretical framework only inadequately explain their actual complex structures.  
 5
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As UNCTAD (2007b) points out, this shortsighted analysis downplays or ignores 
altogether many other fundamental forces behind the integration processes taking place in 
most PTAs today, in favor of a singular fixation with the static welfare gains attached to a 
maximal level of openness and improved allocation efficiency.   
Hence, adequate research that can provide reliable assessments on a PTA’s 
various effects is urgently needed, for it might be precisely their “ambiguous-nature” that 
tempts DCs to invest considerably large economic, political, and institutional resources, 
following a “just-in-case-approach” and hoping to foster economic development (Majluf, 
2004).  This is critical not only because these new PTAs might divert important and 
scarce resources from other development strategies, but also because they might have a 
negative impact, if they are not strategically embraced, by reducing the policy space 
(potential PTA costs) available to DCs.   
Therefore, this thesis seeks to investigate into what other factors and 
circumstances are concerned with and/or altered by the current design of PTAs and how 
they ultimately influence economic development.  This requires taking a more dynamic 
consideration of trade effects beyond welfare gains.  But most importantly, this implies 
shifting from an exclusive focus on trade to incorporating into the analysis other aspects 
of the current economic integration wave, like international capital flows and their 
potential dynamic (positive or negative) effects on development.  This digression from 
conventional thinking allows me to construct an alternative theoretical framework from 
which one can more “realistically” capture the actual development drive of current PTAs. 
In constructing this alternative approach, particular attention is dedicated to the 
analysis of the impact on development of some aspects included in many PTAs today as 
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part of the deep integration process, like government procurement liberalization and IPR 
protection, which are not considered in conventional assessments.  However, some other 
areas, such as labor and environmental standards, labor migration, and competition policy 
are largely omitted from the discussions here.  This is not because they are less important, 
but because I have decided to keep the research more concise, and these aspects are less 
related to the direction and arguments outlined in this thesis.  Short reference will be 
presented when necessary.   
Moreover, my analysis shall be further reinforced by strongly considering the 
overall legal and practical aspects of “negotiating” a PTA, such as, bargaining power and 
general structural asymmetries among future members, which will likely influence the 
final developmental outcome for the DC involved.  I emphasize these issues because one 
of my arguments is that it is not so important whether, in theory, PTAs are beneficial or 
not.  What largely determines their development drive is the outcome of the negotiations.        
This alternative framework will then be applied to the assessment of two different 
types of new regionalism PTAs, namely N-S and S-S.  I have decided to utilize two 
different types as opposed to only one, not only in order to render the study more 
compelling and in line with my arguments, but mainly because conventional assessments, 
mostly based on static trade models, have already drawn strong judgments on the 
developmental features of each type, and have concluded that N-S PTAs are relatively 
more beneficial for development than S-S PTAs.8
Thus, the overall scope of this thesis is to make two related contributions.  First, I 
strive to highlight some of the limitations and inadequacies of traditional PTA analysis in 
 
8 See for example, Schiff and Winters (2003); Mayda and Steinberg (2006); and Lo Turco (2003).  
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assessing the complex integration processes embedded in today’s PTAs.  Second, by 
assessing two different types of current PTAs, I expect to collect some evidence to render 
my thesis compatible with my presumptions.  In fact, I will show that by considering 
several other factors and circumstances involved in the formation of a certain PTA, 
oftentimes, the potentially positive welfare effects can be offset, causing the likely 
reversal of the final result on development of that PTA for the DC.  
The main conclusion of this research echoes increasing literature9 that slowly but 
surely moves away from conventional assessments and into considering the many other 
dynamics of current PTAs.  The general message emerging from this literature is the 
following: although economic integration (even if confined to few countries) can be a 
positive force for economic development, it is not enough to guarantee it.  More 
specifically, it is suggested that DCs should proceed carefully with regards to 
“reciprocal” N-S PTAs given the large various asymmetries among members.  In 
contrast, S-S PTAs, although they present the risk of minimal development benefits due 
to the development level of all members, are still relatively more development-friendly, 
simply because of the more leveled playing field, which increases the possibility of a 
fairer distribution of the benefits.   
The North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), signed in 1994 by Canada, 
the United States (US), and Mexico, was selected as the pioneer of its kind to represent 
the N-S PTAs.  An assessment of NAFTA’s features and its effects on Mexico as the 
developing country is of particular relevance, as it has often been considered a model on 
which to base other N-S PTAs (UNCTAD, 2007b).   
 
9 See for example, UNCTAD (2005 and 2007b); Hoekman (2005); and Khor (2007); and Kreinin and 
Plummer (2003) to mentioned just a few.  
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S-S PTAs are to be represented by the Association of South-East Asia Nations 
(ASEAN), which is one of the most integrated S-S PTAs today.  ASEAN was founded in 
1967 as a political regional alliance that mostly ignored substantial economic integration 
for the first 25 years.  However, after 1992, with the formation of a series of trade and 
investment schemes, such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the ASEAN 
Investment Area (AIA), and ASEAN Industrial Cooperation Scheme (AICO), the 
ASEAN economies decided to join the current regional integration trend.  Although 
ASEAN as a whole will serve as the umbrella agreement, the other complementary 
schemes will be largely the subject of discussion in this research.  ASEAN currently 
includes ten members: Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, 
the Philippines, Brunei, Lao PDR, and Myanmar.10
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Chapter II thoroughly reviews the 
traditional theories behind PTA analysis, highlighting some of their limitations and 
presenting an alternative theoretical framework from which to draw eventual conclusions.  
Chapter III applies this approach to several trade-related/market access issues in NAFTA 
and AFTA assessing the respective accords’ impact on the development efforts of 
Mexico and of the ASEAN economies.  Chapter IV applies the same approach and 
analyzes the impact that NAFTA investment provisions have had on Mexico’s 
development prospects as well as the ASEAN investment schemes on the ASEAN 
members.  Finally, Chapter V thoroughly summarizes the actual development results that 
Mexico and the ASEAN economies have experienced during their respective PTA era.    
 
10 More information on NAFTA and on ASEAN and its different trade and investment schemes is provided 
later throughout the corpus of the paper. 
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CHAPTER II: PRESENTING THE THEORIES 
 
 
 Mainstream economic theory suggests that “poorer” countries could benefit from 
closer integration into the global economy.11  Indeed, as discussed in Chapter I, it seems 
that many DCs today are “partially” following this suggestion by forming PTAs.  
However, as previously mentioned, there are many uncertainties about the goods and 
harms that PTAs can potentially bring to DCs.  These uncertainties, I argue in this thesis, 
are largely derived from the inadequate and limited theories that analyze their effects.  
Hence, in this chapter, it is essential to briefly present the ABCs of these theories in order 
to identify where their inadequacies and limitations are born.  This should allow me to 
build an alternative theoretical framework that can better adapt to the complex structures 
of current PTAs and facilitate a more realistic assessment of their development drive.            
 
2.1. The Traditional Theoretical Framework for PTA Analysis  
Traditionally, as their name implies, PTAs have been primarily concerned with 
trade, and so, trade has been the focus of their study.  Thus, international trade theory has 
functioned as the theoretical backbone for their analysis.  In order to support my claim 
about the limitations of current PTA analysis, I need to briefly present the foundations of 
traditional trade theory so as to illustrate how it perceives trade interaction among 
countries as a welfare improving mechanism and a potential development strategy.  
 
11 See for example, World Bank (2005).  Note, however, that these suggestions are mostly based on 
mainstream trade theory, which lacks substantial empirical support (see Deraniyagala and Fine, 2001).  
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2.1.1. Traditional Trade Theories (TTT)  
The origins of traditional trade theories (TTT) can be traced back to the important 
contributions of two famous British economists, Adam Smith (1776) and David Ricardo 
(1817).  Adam Smith strongly influenced current trade theories with his well-known 
concepts of the Invisible-Hand, the Self-Interest Behavior, and the Absolute Advantage.  
Basically, Adam Smith argued that if every individual and/or nation-state alike, pursuing 
their own interest, focused on doing what they are best at, economic activity would lead 
to maximization of resources, advancement of public welfare, and equality.  David 
Ricardo, the soul founder of TTT, consolidated the benefits of international trade with his 
theory of Comparative Advantage.  Unlike Smith, Ricardo mainly showed that it was not 
necessary to enjoy an absolute advantage for two nations to mutually benefit from trade.  
Instead, it was only necessary to enjoy a comparative advantage in the production of a 
certain commodity over the trading partner for both to obtain substantial welfare gains.   
The basic idea behind these economist’s principles was simple: two nations will 
voluntarily engage in trade if, and only if, they both benefit from doing so; hence, any 
obstacles – managed trade or government interventions – that prohibits, restricts, or tax 
their trade will only diminish the potential welfare improving gains.  This presented the 
first moves away from a mercantilist approach to trade which view trade as a win-lose 
situation instead of a win-win opportunity.    
Largely, these principles have represented, to this day, the underlying foundations 
of TTT and the perception of international trade as a welfare improving practice.  There 
are two central arguments upon which most current trade models are based in one way or 
another.  These arguments present two slightly different approaches for the basis of trade, 
 12
but basically lead to the same outcome – increased welfare resulting from the passage 
from one “steady state” to a better one by efficiently reshuffling the available resources in 
the economy, increasing productivity, welfare, and living standards (see figure II.1).  
The first one is the classical argument and structures its basis for trade as follows: 
two countries possess their own respective scarce amount of resources to allocate among 
different production utilizations, generating a certain Production-Possibility-Frontier 
(PPF).  The respective resources are assumed to be given, and so are the countries’ 
consumption patterns.  Labor is the only factor of production and is completely mobile 
between alternative uses within each country, but not between the two countries.  The 
prices of commodities are solely based on their relative labor cost, which is the same 
among alternative uses within a country.  The only difference, which ultimately creates 
the incentive for trade in the classical model, is the production processes (technology) 
that differ between the two countries, although, this technology is fixed for each country 
and non-transferable between them.   
Secondly, during the early 1900s, with the arrival of neoclassical economics, new 
advancements were presented to the classical argument, trying to further reinforce the 
idea that countries could be better off with trade than in autarky.  One particular model 
stands out: the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model which presented a different argument for 
the basis for trade, but carried on the classical set up in many respects.  Essentially, this 
model argues that countries possess relatively different factor endowments (capital and 
labor) for the production of goods and services, which ultimately determines a country’s 
comparative advantage.  Countries have a comparative advantage in those goods for 
which the required factors of production are relatively abundant locally.  This is because, 
 13
                                                
in this model, the prices of goods and services are ultimately determined by the prices of 
their inputs (rent and wages). Goods and services that require inputs that are locally 
abundant will be cheaper to produce and export than those goods and services that require 
inputs that are locally scarce.  The basis for trade in the H-O model are exclusively based 
on factors endowment differences that yield different prices, since, unlike the classical 
model, technologies are assumed to be identical between the two countries.12   
Practically, if the classical and H-O model rationales are put together, the basis for 
trade arises from differences in production possibilities (different technologies and/or 
factor endowments) that yield different price sets among potential trading partners.13  
Welfare gains then generate in essentially two ways: first, welfare trade gains result from 
exchange (consumption gains) when consumers are exposed to new relative lower prices 
coming from the trading partner.  This allows consumers from country A to reach a 
higher indifference community curve not possible under autarky (moving from CI1 to CI2 
in figure II.1).  Second, welfare trade gains generate from specialization (production 
gains), resulting from resource allocation towards the production of the relatively more 
efficient commodity, increasing overall production efficiency (moving from E to E’ in 
figure II.1) (Appleyard and Field, 2001). 
 
12 Jayme (2001, p. 10) remains us, however, that “there is an extensive discussion in international trade 
literature about the validity of the H-O model.  The most known limitation of this is the Leontief Paradox.  
Leontief (1953) found that the US (a capital-abundant country) exported labor-intensive commodities and 
imported capital-intensive ones, which reverts the H-O arguments”.  Nonetheless, the factor endowment 
rationale is still strongly evoked today to select future trading partners among countries, especially for N-S 
PTAs where there are larger factor endowments differences between future members.  A N-S PTA could 
result mutually beneficial because member countries could more efficiently exploit their respective relative 
abundant-factors of production. 
 
13 Note that in the classical and H-O models the basis for trade take into consideration only supply 
conditions, assuming similar consumption patterns between countries.  However, there are also strong 
neoclassical arguments that present the basis for trade considering differences in demand conditions that 
can generate further gains from trade even between countries with similar production capacities (PPF), see 
Appleyard and Field (2001) for further discussion.  
The following standard trade diagram represents a graphic illustration of the 
positive welfare effects embedded in TTT, setting the basic argument for countries to 
pursue trade interaction as opposed to remain in autarky (figure II.1). 
Figure II.1. Welfare Effects of Trade on a Country (A)  
   
      In autarky, country A is in equilibrium at point E, producing and consuming at the maximum level 
possible.  With the opening of trade, it now faces the international prices, (Px/Py)2.  Given the relative 
higher international price of the X good, production moves to E’, the point of tangency between the 
international prices and the PPF.  At the same time, the Y good is relatively less expensive at 
international prices, so consumers increase their relative consumption of it and begin consuming at 
point C’, where the terms of trade are tangent to the highest community indifference curve possible.  
C’ lies outside the PPF and is obtained by exporting the amount x3x2 of the X good and exchanging it 
for y2y3 imports of the Y good.  The country is clearly better off because trade permits it to consume on 
the higher indifference curve CI2.  The similar (opposite) effects occur for the trading partner (Country 
B), which specializes in the production of good Y, (Source: Appleyard and Field (2001, p. 84).    
 
Of course, this is an over simplistic representation of the arguments behind TTT 
and without a doubt there is a lot more to the content of trade theory.14  However, for the 
purpose of my argument this illustration suffices to demonstrate that, according to TTT, 
the key objective of a PTA should be to increase trade among members to derive welfare 
gains.  In other words, if a PTA increases trade among members, it then becomes 
conclusive that both countries will be better off.  But the question is, can a simple welfare 
improvement derived from resource allocation be considered as a step forward to enhance 
economic development?    
                                                 
 14
14 For a more extensive textbook version of trade theory, see for example, Appleyard and Field (2001). 
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2.1.2. Economic Development and TTT    
As discussed in Chapter I, economic development is the primary objective of DCs 
when forming PTAs.  TTT predict that increased trade improves the well-being of a 
country.  By definition, the goal of PTAs is to increase trade among members.  Thus, 
according to TTT, PTAs could propel development.  Note, however, that in a TTT 
framework, welfare gains derived from trade are subject to a series of assumptions hard 
to overlook when a certain PTA is to function as a motor for development.  Especially 
because with these assumptions TTT fall short in explaining and incorporating obvious 
economic characteristics of most DCs, rendering their arguments, from a DC’s point of 
view, largely incomplete and oftentimes irrelevant.  Therefore, it is important to point out 
some of these assumptions that are particularly relevant to DCs when opting for a PTA as 
a means to overcome some of the chronic features of underdevelopment such as, scarce 
technology and limited industrial resources to spur growth and employment rates.  
First of all, TTT assume “full-employment” of factors of production.  By doing 
so, they do not consider the persistently high levels of unemployment in most DCs.15  As 
Stiglitz and Charlton (2005) point out, with high unemployment one does not need to 
redeploy resources to put more resources into the efficient sectors (i.e. export sectors).  
One simply needs to employ hitherto unused resources.  A simple liberalization of trade 
might not lower unemployment, especially in DCs where oftentimes the effective sectors 
lack the supply capacity to expand enough and absorb not only released resources, but 
 
15 For example, Stiglitz and Charlton (2005) report that in 2001 average unemployment rates reached 
14.4% in Africa, 12.6% in transition economies, and 10% in Latin America.  Moreover, he argues that such 
statistics, however, often under-represent the true level of unemployment – for instance, the prevalent high 
levels of disguised unemployment.   
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also initially idle ones.  Trade liberalization might only lead the economy from low-
productivity to zero-productivity – more unemployment.   
Nonetheless, TTT strongly emphasize that the objective of trade liberalization is 
not to create additional jobs, but to increase standards of living by allowing countries to 
specialize in areas of comparative advantage.  Monetary and fiscal policy should, in 
principle, enable countries to maintain the economy at nearly full-employment (Stiglitz 
and Charlton, 2005).  For example, governments are supposed to compensate the 
negatively affected labor force through domestic redistribution policies such as, income 
taxes , retraining programs, and unemployment assistance.  However, in practice, given 
the almost inexistent unemployment safety nets in most DCs,16 the faulty tax-collecting 
systems to improve them,17 and the low level of education investment,18 it is very likely 
that displaced workers will remain displaced after reallocation process.   
Moreover, in relation to the employment of resources, not only full employment is 
assumed in TTT when a country opens up to trade, but it is also assumed that such 
resources will be costless and immediately reallocated.  However, it is quite unrealistic to 
assume that a farmer will immediately and costlessly make him/herself available in an 
assembly plant where employment has been created from the manufacturing sector’s 
expansion.  It is more likely that even if he or she is able to migrate, he or she will look 
for employment in the “same” sector (agriculture in this case, given the prior skill set), 
 
16 Townsend (2007) reports that most OECD countries spend in public social security in average about 15% 
of their GDP compared to about 2% in most DCs.   
 
17 In average most OECD countries fund their public social security expending in average about 65% from 
tax-revenue, while most DCs (with the exception of China) average from 8-14% (Townsend, 2007).   
 
18 Soubbotina and Sheram (2000) report that although DCs are devoting a larger share of their GDP to 
education efforts than in the past, they are still lagging behind developed countries – 3.3% and 5.4% 
respectively.  Moreover, developed countries spend large amounts on private education subsidies.   
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where available.  The migration would likely be towards the trading partner that has 
expanded this sector consequent upon a PTA.  This is, oftentimes, one of the causes of 
international migration as opposed to internal migration (see Jansen and Lee, 2007). 
Secondly, both the classical and the H-O models allow for the reallocation of the 
factors of production within the country but do not allow for mobility of the same across 
borders.  This highlights an important limitation of TTT on analyzing the dynamics of 
current PTAs where capital is highly mobile across borders through foreign investments, 
but labor is not yet free to move internationally.  This strongly favors the capital-
abundant member of the PTA (the developed country), allowing it to move its resources 
to where they can be more efficiently employed, but disadvantages the labor-abundant 
member (the DC) by restricting the reallocation of labor to its own borders.   
Thirdly, the H-O model, in particular, assumes identical production technologies 
across countries.  Again, this model fails to capture a rather vital characteristic of 
underdevelopment – the lack of an efficient technological base in the economies of most 
DCs.  A theory that takes it as a given is particularly unattractive to DCs, because most 
DCs tend to rely on exogenous technical changes which mostly occur in industrialized 
countries (Stewart, 1992).19  Hence, if PTAs are to be taken as a vehicle for development, 
there has to be some technology transmission variable that might allow technology 
spillovers from innovators to absorbers if a technological upgrading is to take place.  
Lastly, TTT assume similar consumption patterns among trading partners.  This 
implies, as Jayme (2001) points out, that demand structures are identical in all trading 
countries, which means that goods and services are consumed at given relative prices and 
 
19 See Lall (2000b) for further discussion on technology upgrading and development. 
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independent of income levels.  However, if consumption patterns and preferences are 
purely measured by income levels, it becomes evident that high-income industrialized 
countries would have different preferences than low-income DCs.20  This is because most 
DCs are characterized by unskilled, low-technology, and labor-intensive production 
processes, generating low-income-characteristics goods, which might face limitations in 
penetrating high-income consumers from industrialized countries (see Chapter III).   
In conclusion, once the general rationales of TTT are confronted with a dose of 
reality, it is extremely difficult to elaborate a correlation between PTAs and development 
through the TTT lens, especially because their very assumptions create a sort of 
retroactive and stationary mode of engaging in international trade and ignore altogether 
other aspects of economic integration such as capital and labor flows.  As an overall 
message, TTT suggest that countries should exploit their initial comparative advantages 
and remain stagnant in doing so because it is initially beneficial.  These theories do not 
leave much space for enhancing a country’s initial comparative advantage and 
progressively move forward.  Otherwise, the incentive of welfare gains from trade is no 
longer relevant.  As Stewart (1992, p. 70) states, “the prime concern of DCs is 
development (i.e. to change their factor endowments, their incomes, and their 
consumptions patterns), they tend to find a theory, such as the H-O, which assumes all 




20 This reasoning is largely reflected in the works of Linder (1961) and the new trade theories of 
“Preference Similarities”, in which is explained that differentiated products are developed for the home 
market in accordance with domestic preferences.  These preferences depend in large on income levels.  
Hence, the products are exported to markets with similar tastes (Stewart, 1992).      
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2.1.3. The Application of TTT to PTA Assessments    
Notwithstanding the irrelevance of TTT to explain how welfare improvements 
derived from increased trade are to propel development and the fact that increasing trade 
is no longer the exclusive goal of today’s PTAs, the TTT framework still largely function 
as the primary benchmark for assessing the effects of most PTAs today.  Indeed, most 
assessments of current PTAs focus on whether and how their particular mixture of trade 
liberalization and discrimination alters economic welfare by creating or diverting trade. 
These advancements on PTA assessments are mainly attributed to the seminal 
works of Jacob Viner (1950) who noted that, since PTAs liberalized trade preferentially, 
they “create”, on one hand, new trade between PTA members while, they “divert” trade, 
on the other.  The former effect takes place whenever a PTA leads to a shift in product 
origin from a domestic producer whose resource costs are higher to a member producer 
whose resource costs are lower.  This shift represents a movement in the direction of 
efficient resource allocation and thus is presumably beneficial for welfare.  The latter 
effect takes place whenever there is a shift in product origin from a non-member producer 
whose resource costs are lower to a member country producer whose resource costs are 
higher.  This movement represents a movement away from efficient resource allocation 
and could reduce welfare.  Since both trade creation and trade diversion are possible 
within a certain PTA, PTAs are considered “second-best” because they represent only a 
partial movement to free trade (Appleyard and Field, 2001).21   
 
21 In fact, opponents of PTAs argue that these discriminatory schemes distract (or even subtract) from the 
optimal welfare gains that could be obtained from a truly open global system.  As such, PTAs are seen as 
“stumbling blocs” as opposed to “building blocs”.  An adequate discussion of these arguments is out of my 
scope here, for more details see for example, Krueger (1999a) and Bhagwati (1992). 
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Whether or not PTAs produce net welfare benefits to member countries is still an 
empirical issue.  However, the majority of the few studies undertaken22 have tended to 
report small effects on both members and non-members, with net trade creation being the 
more likely outcome, and generally positive, although small, overall welfare gains, 
specially for N-S PTAs (UNCTAD, 2007b).  Nevertheless, several empirical studies on 
S-S PTAs have resulted in trade diversion and hence, welfare losses (see below). 
However, is this predominant case of trade creation and trade diversion, mainly 
based on static welfare effects, sufficient to truly capture and assess the development 
drive of current PTAs?  Certainly not, I argue in this thesis.  Rather, a broader approach 
that incorporates other aspects included in current PTAs on an individual PTA basis 
could be proven more appropriate.     
There is one thing in common between assessing a certain PTA from a static 
perspective and assessing it with an alternative approach, as the approach used in this 
research.  That is, a different PTA (i.e. N-S and S-S) will result in a different overall 
developmental outcome for the DC, but that outcome might be the opposite.  For 
example, in a static assessment, N-S PTAs might offer welfare gains because it 
potentially “creates” trade among members.  However, as discussed in more detail below, 
increased trade resulting from the PTA does not necessarily imply increased market 
access for goods and services that can beneficially influence the development of the DC.  
Rather, other factors and circumstances (potential PTA costs), which are neglected in 
static assessments, can easily turn around the net outcome of a N-S PTA, and potentially 
even hinder the development efforts of the DC involved.   
 
22 See for example, Eicher et. al. (2007); Fugazza and Vanzetti (2006); Cernat (2003); and Mayda and 
Steinberg (2006).  
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In contrast, the developmental outcome of S-S PTAs from a static assessment is 
quite inconclusive.  Some studies, such as Lo Turco (2003) and Mayda and Steinberg 
(2006) conclude that S-S PTAs mostly lead to slower growth among members because of 
their potential to “divert” trade.  Other assessments, such as Fugazza and Vanzetti (2006) 
and Cernat (2003), report enormous potentials for trade creation and thus welfare gains.23  
However, again, these assessments fail to consider any other factors and circumstances in 
PTAs beyond trade that can reveal extra developmental potentials from S-S PTAs, 
perhaps not by increasing the gains, but by reducing the costs of trade liberalization. 
 
2.2. Constructing an Alternative Approach to PTA Analysis 
It is now evident that, for the purpose of this research, a complementary 
theoretical approach to static welfare gains from trade has to be constructed in order to 
present a theoretical framework from which to improve the general understanding of how 
economic integration might enhance economic development.  Because, as pointed out by 
some,24 a truly economic integration process includes many other aspects beyond trade 
matters that cannot be fully captured by conventional assessments. Perhaps, PTAs are not 
precisely to be considered as full economic integration, but they do currently include 
many other aspects beyond trade integration (Chapter I).   
 
23 For example, these studies report that, since tariffs among DCs in average are higher (11.1%) compared 
to (4.3%) between developed countries, there is more space for further liberalization.  Moreover, trade 
among DCs has grown faster than both between developed countries and/or DCs and developed countries, 
12.5%, 7%, 9.8% respectively.  These studies estimate that a 10% tariff cut could be associated with a 1.6% 
increase in world exports between DCs.  This could be translated as additional US$5.7 billion net gains; 
interestingly, the data indicates that an equivalent tariff reduction in N-N and/or N-S trade could have a 
smaller impact on trade flows and welfare gains.  Welfare gains could total as much as US$35 billion from 
a S-S liberalization, compared to US$22 billion from a N-S liberalization (Fugazza and Vanzetti, 2006).  
     
24 See for example, Kondonassis (2001).  
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By no means can it be possible to construct an alternative approach that does full 
justice to measuring the effects of PTAs on development.  However, to restrict any 
evaluation to a single variable (trade effects) might not be quite enlightening either.  As 
far as DCs are concerned, a “PTA Theory” needs to consider general development effects 
beyond the obvious welfare gains from allocation efficiency.  These include 
accumulation of physical and human capital, learning to develop future endowments to 
change the initial comparative advantages, employment, and technology acquisition 
(Stewart, 1992).  Therefore, in this section, not only is a dynamic approach as opposed to 
static approach to the effects of increased trade embraced, but also an additional 
important aspect of economic integration is considered – international capital flows. 
There is increasing literature that has attempted to capture both the economic 
effects of the so-called “dynamic” trade gains and the implications, beneficial or harmful, 
resulting from international capital flows, but this literature has not yet been specifically 
directed towards the study of PTAs and development.   
On one hand, some studies,25 mostly derived from the marriage between new 
trade and endogenous growth theories, have tried to individualize these dynamic trade 
gains, mainly by highlighting two concepts: “scale economies” and what is referred to as 
“trade-knowledge”.  The former, as Jayme (2001) points out, plays the core argument of 
new trade theories, which strongly stress the importance of “increasing” returns to scale 
as a determinant factor for long-term growth.26  The latter refers to additional forms of 
capital, human capital and technology, that can endogenously propel long-run growth and 
 
25 See for example, Baldwin (1993b); Nordas et. al. (2006); Wacziarg (2001); and Venables (2001). 
 
26 However, Deraniyagala and Fine (2001, p. 811) point out that if sectors characterized by scale economies 
are not affected by the liberalization process, this type of dynamic gain will not materialize.  
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development.27  On the other hand, several studies28 have identified the important role 
that international capital flows are currently playing in the domestic-investment-
dynamics of most DCs.  Most importantly, these flows have been widely recognized to 
potentially offer an array of “dynamic side” benefits for economic development.   
But how can the formation of a PTA allow these dynamic benefits to be directed 
towards development?  For the purpose of these research, I have selected two rather 
common “delivery-vehicles” (as I will refer to them throughout this paper) that could 
facilitate the flow.  These are “Market Access” and “Foreign Investment”, which I will 
discuss in turn below, aiming at constructing a more “realistic” theoretical framework 
from which to evaluate the impact of PTAs on economic development. 
 
2.2.1. Delivery-Vehicles:  Market Access and Foreign Investment 
Today, the two main reasons for DCs to form PTAs are to obtain increased access 
to the partner’s markets and to attract foreign investments.  Hence, it is essential to 
analyze the potential (positive or negative) effects on development that this implies. 
   
A). Market Access:  As Cadot et. al. (2005) point out, the perception of 
“increased market access” in recent years has gained a lot of popularity in international 
trade discussions as one of the core conditions to obtain from economic integration by 
DCs, for that it is heralded as the key for their successful integration into the world 
 
27 These concepts have been largely pioneered by several authors such as, Krugman (1990); Grossman and 
Helpman (1990; 1991); Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991).  
 
28 See for example, Lall and Narula (2004); UNCTAD, (1999; 2006d); and Prasad, Kose, Rogoff and Wei 
(2006) (in Plummer and Cheong, 2008, p. 1).   
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market.  From a development perspective, market access is basically seen as the 
opportunity to overcome the “smallness” chronic problem of many DCs’ domestic 
markets and the many drawbacks that a small market represents (see UNCTAD, 2005).  
The formation of a PTA offers a real and immediate opportunity to “enlarge” the size of 
the market and reap the diverse benefits that come with it.  As such, increased market 
access represents one of the “delivery-vehicles” that could bring about several dynamic 
benefits from international trade, such as physical capital formation, employment, and 
skill and technology spillovers (see next section).29
However, increasing literature30 warns of the fact that an enlarged market 
resulting from a PTA does not necessarily imply actual increased market access for those 
sectors that can benefit the development prospects of DCs.  The formation of a PTA 
might well result only in net increased trade flows for the trading bloc, but oftentimes, 
market access for many DCs to the partner’s markets is restricted by many other factors, 
such as supply capacity constraints, and/or consumption patterns differences (see below).  
Moreover, market access for the DC can be further influenced by the type of PTA 
that is formed (N-S or S-S).  Certain characteristics of each type of PTA will have a 
determinant impact on the level of market access that the DC obtains.  For example, the 
principle of reciprocity that both N-S and S-S embrace, the restrictiveness of Rules of 
Origin (RoO), and any trade distorting measures such as subsidies and other non-trade 
barriers will all have an impact (see Chapter III, UNCTAD, 2007b, and Khor, 2007).  
 
29 Moreover, Bernard et. al. (2007) argue that, with an enlarged market, aggregate productivity will raise 
from the survival and expansion of effective firms.  Note, however, that this argument assumes that DCs 
have effective firms capable of expansion.  Also, this argument does not allow for weak firms to evolve.     
 
30 See for example, Cadot et. al. (2005); and Estevadeordal (1999); and UNCTAD (2005).  
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 B). Foreign Investment:  Few doubt that investment is one of the most, if not the 
most, determinant factor for growth and development.31  Nonetheless, it is also true that 
one of the main constraints of most DCs is the lack of both public and private adequate 
domestic savings to generate the necessary investments.  Recent findings show, on one 
hand, that overall public investment has been declining, as a share of GDP, in the 
developing world over the past two decades.  On the other hand, recent research 
demonstrates that private domestic investment has not compensated for the drop of public 
investment as it was hoped (Roy, et al., 2006).  
This has permitted the role of Transnational Corporations (TNCs), as source of 
capital for DCs, to grow over time (Lall and Narula, 2004).  This, as mentioned before, 
has rendered foreign investment from TNCs (perhaps the most important form of 
international capital flows) crucial in calculating the dynamic benefits that can be 
obtained by DCs from a PTA, making it another important delivery-vehicle of benefits 
from economic integration and/or PTAs.   
Foreign capital inflows into DCs from TNCs come mainly in two forms, namely 
Portfolio Investments and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), which are further 
subdivided into Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) and Greenfield Projects.32  The 
effects on development resulting from these types of foreign investment greatly vary 
from one another.  The former, for example, has been identified as having an ambiguous 
 
31 Robust empirical evidence is reported in UNCTAD (2003, p. 61) showing that investment is one of the 
few variables that independently and significantly impact the rate of economic growth.  These include: 
Levine and Renelt (1992); Sala-i-Martin (1997); and Ros (2000).  
 
32 According to UNCTAD, OECD, and IMF standards, Portfolio Investment refers to equity ownership of a 
company without obtaining the managerial control of the entity.  FDI gives managerial control of the entity 
to the foreign investor. 
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and immeasurable impact on development, for that international capital markets are quite 
volatile and their final impact on an economy is quite difficult to capture.33  Therefore, I 
will largely omit any comprehensive discussion of this type of foreign investment in this 
research.  However, reference will be made when necessary.   
The latter, on the other hand, has been largely identified as the main facilitator of 
dynamic development gains for DCs, mainly in the form of Greenfield projects, which in 
turn, according to UNCTAD (1999), enter an economy in four main types: i) natural-
resource-seeking investments, ii) market-seeking investments, iii) strategic-asset-seeking 
investment, and iv) efficiency-seeking investments.  Note that each of these types of FDI 
will generate different kinds of externalities for the host economy in technology, 
employment, and physical and human capital accumulation (see below). 
However, DCs have to attract such investments in the first place, which mainly 
depends on domestic capabilities,34 matching the wants and needs of foreign investors.  
Thus, it is very important to strongly emphasize that the mere formation of a certain PTA 
with investment provisions and/or separate investment schemes will not automatically 
guarantee inflows of foreign investment.  Indeed, there is little evidence supporting this 
argument.35  Rather, FDI tends to respond where local capabilities are strong when trade 
liberalization takes place and feeblest where they are weak (Lall and Narula, 2004).  
 
33 See for example, Weisskopf, 1972 (in UNCTAD, 1999, p. 31).  
 
34 See for example, UNCTAD (1999); Miyamoto (2003); and Plummer and Cheong (2008) for a detailed 
discussion on FDI determinants. 
 
35 UNCTAD (1998), Hallward-Driemeier (2002) (in Stiglitz and Charlton, 2005, p. 150), and more recently 
Plummer and Cheong (2008) found little evidence that Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) increased 
foreign investment inflows into DCs.  However, Lesher and Miroudot (2006) make an important distinction 
between BITs and investment “provisions” in PTAs, reporting that the former does not have an impact on 
FDI flows, but that the latter are positively associated with FDI flows.    
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Nonetheless, the fact that DCs enter a certain PTA, oftentimes is perceived by 
foreign investors as a positive factor that might increase the rate of return to their 
investments.  In addition, as reported by UNCTAD (1999),36 there are certain location-
specific advantages of individual countries that play an important role in attracting FDI.  
Among these are some that can be enhanced by PTAs, such as the size of the market in 
which TNCs can operate allowing the realization of scale economics, productivity of 
local producers increased from resource allocation, and local cost-efficient factors of 
production made more available by the opening of the economy.    
Yet, attracting FDI is only the first part of the process that allows DCs to benefit, 
a process that is subject to numerous conditions.  For example, the “quality” of the FDI 
generates more benefits as opposed to the “quantity”.  Moreover, as in the case of market 
access, there are some particular characteristics embraced in many PTAs that include 
investment provisions, such as expropriation clauses, national treatment, performance 
requirements, and transfer-pricing,37 that will further influence the level of benefits that 
can be obtained from increased inward FDI, enhancing or hindering its impact on 
development.  Furthermore, UNCTAD (2006d) points out that the origin (developed or 
DCs) of inward FDI might further influence its benefits to the host economy.  Ultimately, 
once more and better inward FDI has been attracted, the final and real impact on 
development will largely depend on the host-economy’s absorbing capacity and the 
overall proactive involvement of domestic governments to ensure the realization of such 
benefits (see section 2.2.3).  
 
36 This reasoning is largely attributed to Dunning (1981, 1993a, and 1993b) (UNCTAD, 1999, p. 5) 
 
37 See chapter IV for further discussion as well as Khor (2007); and UNCTAD (2007b). 
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2.2.2. “Potential Dynamic” Gains from PTAs 
 There are four potential dynamic sets of gains that can directly and positively 
affect the development efforts of DCs when entering a PTA.  Both market access and FDI 
can contribute in delivering them in several ways.  These include physical capital 
formation and economic activity, employment, technology spillovers, and human capital 
and skill enhancement, which are discussed in turn below.  
 
1). Physical Capital Formation and Economic Activity:     
 One of the fundamental teachings of neoclassical growth theories is the 
indispensable role of physical capital accumulation in the enhancement of economic 
growth.  Though still not sufficient, as later argued by endogenous growth theories, it is 
still a determinant factor of growth (UNCTAD, 2007b).  PTAs, by enlarging the market 
and possibly attracting FDI, can play a determinant role in forming new physical capital.  
 First, an enlarged market allows DC’s producers to reap larger gains from scale 
economies.  According to Ethier (in Stewart, 1992, p. 89), “the size of the global market 
is the limiting factor in determining specialization and economies of scale”.  Gains from 
scale economies can potentially increase profits and the rate of private investment, which 
can generate physical capital (UNCTAD, 2003).  However, as noted by Deraniyagala and 
Fine (2001), these gains are subject to the number of industries characterized by scale 
economies in the country and to the positive inclusion of those industries in the 
liberalization process.  Moreover, Bernard et. al. (2007) argue that trade liberalization 
triggers a certain reallocation of economic activity across firms, which can raise 
aggregate productivity from the expansion of high-productivity firms and the contraction 
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of low-productivity firms.  Nonetheless, DCs can be disadvantaged (i.e. in a N-S PTA) in 
benefiting from both scale economies and/or aggregate productivity, since they typically 
have few industries and firms that can exploit these benefits.      
Secondly, foreign investment inflows potentially attracted by the PTA, as 
discussed previously, might directly affect the domestic rate of savings and investment, 
generating physical capital.  However, the impact might be small, especially if the 
inflows are in the form of portfolio investments.  For example, UNCTAD (1999) reports 
that, in the ‘90s, large capital inflows into several DCs did not generally lead to increases 
in total investment, and actually, domestic saving fell.  If foreign savings merely crowd 
out domestic savings with no change in investment rates, the usefulness of foreign capital 
for capital formation, a key factor in development, can be questioned.  On the other hand, 
if the inflows are in the form of FDI, particularly Greenfield investments as opposed to 
M&A, foreign investment might have a more positive impact on physical capital 
formation; yet, the effect might still be small due to the fact that on average FDI accounts 
for only 3% of GDP (UNCTAD, 2007b).  Nonetheless, FDI can still stimulate economic 
activity by creating backward and forward linkages with the domestic economy.  
 
2). Employment and Wages:  
 As previously mentioned, TTT are quite ambiguous in regards to the relationship 
between trade and employment.  This ambiguity results from the fact that TTT were not 
concerned with the reallocation process of labor itself (i.e. the loss of jobs and the process 
of finding a new one), as Jansen and Lee (2007) explained.  Rather, this process was 
assumed to take place instantaneously without any effect on employment.  However, 
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during transition periods, trade liberalization can have significant effects on employment 
if the economy is not characterized by full-employment, or if some domestic policy or 
labor market failures hamper the adjustment process.  Moreover, although TTT 
presumably do not allow for an effect on the “quantity” of jobs, they do imply an effect 
on the “quality” of jobs, better or worse paid jobs, as a result of trade liberalization.38
Thus, in this context, it can be concluded that trade liberalization, and therefore 
PTAs, do affect the level of employment as well as wages.  Hence, if strategically 
approached, PTAs have the potential to help DCs overcome the initial unemployment 
problem and create better paid jobs when liberalizing trade.  Of course, in order for this to 
take place successfully, the economic integration process needs to be accompanied by a 
coherent set of structural and social policies (Lee, 2005).   
First, as already mentioned, PTAs can enlarge the size of a DC’s local markets.  
This, in theory, could potentially allow the efficient exporting firms from DCs to expand 
enough and absorb not only displaced labor resources, but also some of the initially idle 
ones.  Of course, the extent to which “efficient” firms take advantage of exporting 
opportunities is subject to many other factors, such as supply capacity constraints.  
Second, FDI projects in certain sectors, like call centers and other labor-intensive 
activities, have the tangible effect of creating local employment without releasing any 
employed labor.  In addition, as mentioned before, FDI has the potential capacity to 
increase commercial activity by creating linkages with the domestic economy.  This can 
potentially increase the demand for domestic labor by expanding domestic firms in order 
to supply the newly established foreign firms (UNCTAD, 1999).  
 
38 For further discussion, see for example, Jansen and Lee (2007); Lee (2005); and Ghose (2000). 
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3). Technology Spillovers and Innovation:  
 Perhaps the most highly desired benefits that DCs seek from closer integrating 
into the world economy are in the area of technology.  TTT, like the H-O model, assume 
similar technologies across borders; hence, it undermines the one main requirement for 
growth and development as strongly affirmed by endogenous growth theories, which 
largely base economic growth on technological change.  Moreover, UNCTAD (1999) 
reports that contrary to what neoclassical growth models postulate, technology is not a 
free good that is available for use by producers everywhere because it cannot be traded 
like a physical product.  Instead, technology markets are opaque and often subject to 
information failures. 
In turn, new trade theories such as “learning economics” put forward mainly by 
Westphal (1982), Stewart (1982), and Krugman (1984) have recognized the potentials of 
international trade to help alleviate the backwardness of most DCs’ technological base 
(Stewart, 1982).  In essence, these theories argue that DCs can greatly benefit from 
international trade by “learning” from the international-technology power house.  This 
can happen in several ways by increasing market access and foreign investment inflows.  
 First, international trade allows exposure to a greater variety of traded goods from 
both imports and new domestic products developed to serve the enlarged market.  This 
increased variety of commodities embraces a great deal of embedded technology 
(knowledge capital) that could be absorbed by utilization and/or reverse engineering.  
Grossman and Helpman (1990; 1991) argue that benefits accrue in an industry and an 
economy through “trade-knowledge”.  This trade-knowledge includes, and can be 
modeled as, gains from foreign R&D embodied in traded goods, technology transfers 
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through trade, process innovation, best practice implementation, and imported 
intermediate goods of variety and quality.  Note, however, that this requires an initial 
minimal R&D base, strategic investment towards R&D efforts, and a minimal absorbing 
capacity, human capital, something in which many DCs lag behind, as it will be 
discussed in the next section (also see Deraniyagala and Fine, 2001). 
 Second, as Lall and Narula (2004) point out, TNCs continue to dominate the 
creation of technology; indeed, with the rising costs and risks of innovation, their 
importance has risen.  Hence, FDI inflows from TNCs can potentially generate 
substantial “spillovers” not only of new technologies, but also of the technical know-how 
to operate them.  New established plants bring along new machinery and, perhaps, new 
processes that allow for more efficient operation of existing domestic technologies.     
Nonetheless, technology transfers from both increased trade commodities and FDI 
projects can be hindered by the very PTA that has generated them, meaning that 
burdensome IPR packages included in the PTA might well block any technology 
transfers.  This might have a greater impact in the case of N-S PTAs, which involves 
large technology creators with usually stricter regulations that protect that technology.  
Northern countries might carry on their domestic legislation on IPR to DCs when 
forming a PTA hindering technology transfers (see Chapter IV).      
 
4). Human Capital and Skill Enhancement: 
The level of human capital that a country possesses is one of the few variables 
empirically tested to have a determinant impact on the rate of economic growth.39  
 
39 Miyamoto (2003, p. 44) lists several studies supporting this argument. 
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Indeed, human capital accumulation is the other key factor of endogenous growth 
theories, as mentioned before.  Although it can only be mainly developed from within, 
and although it is actually a prerequisite to benefit from economic integration (see next 
section), it can also be enhanced by positive externalities when economic integration 
takes place, thereby creating a prosperous cycle, as Miyamoto (2003) argues.    
 First, a larger market will generate increased productivity resulting from resource 
allocation, but most importantly, from increased “specialization”.  As Stewart (1992) 
points out, Adam Smith demonstrated with his pin-production example that division of 
labor enables specialization, which in turn pushes “repetition” of certain tasks, allowing 
individuals to acquire higher levels of skill and learn new methods to produce 
commodities more efficiently.  But, as Adam Smith noted, such specialization is limited 
by the extent of the market; the size of the market determines how much division of labor 
and specialization is justified.   
 Secondly, and certainly more importantly, FDI from TNCs (mainly Greenfield 
projects) is likely to introduce more sophisticated managerial practices and high-skilled 
personal.  Local labor can greatly benefit from learning-by-doing, and imitation.  
Moreover, a great part of FDI projects, especially in the manufacturing sectors, include 
some sort of “training” for the employed local labor, increasing the general skill level and 
technical know-how (UNCTAD, 1999).40  In addition, Miyamoto (2003) reports that 
TNCs not only contribute to skill-enhancement of the local labor force, but they also 
engage oftentimes in supporting formal education.   
 
40 A report done by the World Bank, “World Business Environment Survey”, shows that approximately 
60% of firms in both East Asia and Latin America regions conducted some formal training in the year 2000 
(Batra and Tan, 2002; Batra, 2003, in Miyamoto, 2003, p. 19).   
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2.2.3. From Theory to Practice 
Theory is quite difficult to put into practice; hence, it is not to be assumed that 
DCs will be able to materialize the abovementioned gains.  As UNCTAD (2007b) notes, 
an efficient development path requires more than mere “external integration”.  This is 
because benefiting from external development forces is strongly preconditioned by an 
intensive “internal integration” process, which implies expanding domestic markets, 
shifting patterns of employment, improving infrastructure, and creating a dense domestic 
network of input-output linkages.  By the same token, internal integration needs to be 
supported by strong economic-socio-political institutions and proactive governments.  
 
A). Absorbing Capacity: This characteristic will largely determine the realization 
of potential dynamic gains that can be generated from FDI inflows.  As briefly mentioned 
before, there are different types of FDI and they all offer different positive externalities to 
the host economy.  However, this will be determined not only by the “quantity” of the 
FDI attracted, but most importantly, by the “quality” of it.  
For example, natural-resource-seeking FDI, which refers to projects of extraction 
and processing of natural resources, has been traditional related to large amounts of 
capital-intensive projects with little impact on the host economy as far as employment 
and technology spillovers.41  Besides, they require some kind of natural resources 
endowments in the host economy, which might not always be the case.  On the other 
 
41 Also, as stated by the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, the concentration on the production and export of 
natural resources and raw materials, with time deteriorates the terms of trade for DCs.  Partially, this is 
because new technologies have replaced many natural raw resources with synthetic products, thereby 
decreasing the world demand for the former (Appleyard and Field, 2001).  
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hand, market-seeking and strategic-asset-seeking FDI42 might bring an array of benefits 
impossible to obtain without such FDI, because these are internal to TNCs.  For the 
former, these include new technologies and/or new methods of operating existing ones, 
international market networks, backward and forward linkages, established brand-names, 
managerial know-how, and employment opportunities.  The latter includes mostly R&D 
increased capabilities.  However, the attraction of these types of FDI usually requires 
large domestic markets and certain high levels local capabilities (UNCTAD, 1999).   
Efficiency-seeking FDI will be largely discussed in this research since it is the 
type that historically has been most easily attracted by DCs.  It mainly occurs when TNCs 
locate part of their value-added production chain abroad in order to improve their 
profitability.  The oldest of such investments have been labor-seeking investments.  As 
wages rose in home countries, TNCs sought to obtain access to low-cost labor DCs by 
locating in them the labor-intensive segments of their production processes.  Attracting 
this kind of FDI is usually easier for DCs, since they are characterized by a labor surplus 
which makes it cheap and attractive to TNCs.  
However, the benefits of this kind of FDI can be questioned because of its two 
potential outcomes.  On one side, it can bring several benefits, as UNCTAD (1999) 
points out, the shifting of labor-intensive processes to DCs has probably been the most 
important factor behind the growth of their manufactured exports in the past three 
decades.  Most importantly, this type of FDI is particularly attractive for its employment 
creation feature by employing idle labor resources.  On the other hand, the fact that this 
 
42 Market-seeking or “tariff-jumping” FDI basically relates to the establishment of foreign affiliates in the 
host economy to expand their market share and increase their competitiveness from reduced transport and 
tariff costs.  Strategic-asset-seeking FDI mainly occurs in R&D areas (UNCTAD, 1999).    
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FDI is mainly attracted by a static comparative advantage (cheap-labor), oftentimes 
means that the benefits from it to DCs diminish or altogether vanish once the static 
comparative advantage is exhausted (when wages rise).  
To this end, it is needless to stress the role that a country’s capabilities play in 
attracting FDI (quantity), but most importantly in the type of FDI that will be attracted 
(quality) and the capacity to retain that investment.  Lall and Narula (2004) point out that 
absorptive capacity is significant for development because it allows domestic actors to 
capture knowledge that exists elsewhere.  Where absorptive capacity is lacking in 
domestic firms, they may, instead of reaping technological benefits from FDI, be 
“crowded out”.  Capabilities in the host country context matter for the magnitude and 
intensity of technological updating.  Lall and Narula (2004) further report that several 
authors have noted that a minimum level of scientific and technical knowledge is 
required to use innovation.  Below this level, the cost of adoption can be prohibitive.43   
Moreover, Saggi (2002) stresses the difference between technology “transfer” and 
technology “diffusion”.  This means that technology might be internationally transferred 
through various channels, but will not necessarily be diffused throughout the rest of the 
economy.  Domestic actors play a critical role in this process, where the level of human 
capital within the economy will largely determine its diffusion.  In addition, as previously 
mentioned, the process of technology diffusion can be hindered by the set of burdensome 
IPR packages embraced in a certain PTA.  IPR regulation might well allow the 
technology transfer to take place within the TNC and/or to certain enclave sectors, but the 
diffusion to the rest of the economy might be restricted.      
 
43 Other studies reported in Lall and Narula (2004) present further empirical evidence of the need of a 
minimum absorbing capacity in order for DCs to be able to absorb benefits from FDI.  
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B). Supply Capacity Constraints: This characteristic will largely affect the 
realization of dynamic gains that might result from an enlarged market simply because 
the country is not able to respond to the increased demand (i.e. scale economies and 
aggregate productivity, p.28-29).  Most DCs lack important elements that constitute the 
overall local producers’ capacity not only to initially respond to a larger demand, but also 
to increase their existing potential.  These elements include general infrastructure, such as 
an extensive transportation network of roads and speedways, capable port infrastructure, 
widespread communications networks, and reliable and efficient power and water 
supplies that will initially enable producers to serve the enlarged market.44  Moreover, 
accessible and well functioning credit markets are a determinant element since financing 
is critical in both expansions and new start-ups.45  Also, labor mobility (efficient 
transportation) needs to be improved, allowing displaced workers to more easily move to 
exporting sectors where they might be needed.   
If the abovementioned conditions are nonexistent or inefficient, the potential 
benefits from economic integration become obsolete when enlarging the market.  Supply 
capacity constrains might even have negative effects, especially when entering a PTA 
with a supply-capable partner (i.e. N-S PTA).  In a N-S PTA, the DC might not be able to 
respond to market access opportunities, but what is worse is that its domestic markets are 
vulnerable to swamping by the northern country’s competitive and abundant products 
(Fugazza and Vanzetti, 2006).  This might further press down weaker domestic 
producers.  On the other hand, in a S-S PTA there may be many missed opportunities due 
 
44 For a detailed discussion on adequate infrastructure and supply capacity as well as differences between 
DCs and industrialized countries see for example, World Bank (2008b); and UNCTAD (2005).  
 
45 See World Bank (2008a); and UNCTAD (2005) for a detailed discussion on credit restraints in DCs.  
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to supply capacity constraints, but at least there is no significantly superior supply-
capable member to swamp the other members’ markets.  Hence, it is important to stress 
that if there are significant pre-existing production asymmetries among PTA members, 
not only the weaker partner misses out of the opportunities, but also the stronger party 
might get the lion’s share of the benefits (see Chapter III).  
   
C). Government Intervention: The ultimate element in realizing dynamic and/or 
static gains from economic integration (PTAs in this case), delivered by both market 
access and foreign investment, is the proactive role that domestic governments play in the 
entire odyssey.46  Making sure that an economy maximizes the benefits, or at least 
diminishes the costs of all aspects of economic integration, is a job that cannot be done 
by any theory, but only by local governments in interaction with their business 
communities and social institutions.  There are some areas in which a proactive role of 
the government can be essential to benefit from full or partial economic integration.  
First, before opting for across-the-board trade liberalization program hoping that it 
will promote development, domestic governments need to a priori assess, and to 
“design”, so to speak, the direction and form of trade liberalization that they need.  This 
requires extensive “economic” knowledge about their potentials and weaknesses and not 
just “political” support.  Eventually, this can give insights as to what sectors to liberalize, 
under what terms, and whether the benefits will not be outweighed by the costs, thus, 
designing beneficial liberalization schedules with enough built-in flexibility.  Of course, 
 
46 Authors such as Hoekman (2005); Lall and Narula (2004); Lall (2000a), and reports such as UNCTAD 
(1999, 2005, and 2007b) very much stress the important role that domestic governments should play in 
realizing the benefits from economic integration.  
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this is by no means an easy task, especially when negotiating N-S PTAs.  Northern 
countries are oftentimes not interested in a PTA with a DC mainly due to the low 
incentives from a small market, unless advantageous concessions are offered, which 
automatically results in a disadvantageous agreement for the DC.  Hence, forming S-S 
PTAs offers a “fairer” negotiating setup.  As I argue throughout this thesis, the 
developmental benefits of PTAs are not only determined by theory, but largely by the 
outcome of negotiations in designing them, where bargaining power is likely to have an 
enormous real impact.   
 Second, trade theory has documented well that trade liberalization will result in 
winners and losers.  Hence, the government needs to identify those losers and be ready to 
assist them in integrating into the reallocation process.  This can be done by creating 
realistic safety nets, such as unemployment assistance, training programs, and overall 
increased investment in education, which ultimately will do both help individuals to be 
able to allocate into the new enlarging sectors and increase the human capital stock to 
better absorb the positive externalities that might come from the overall economic 
integration process, but specifically from inward FDI. 
 Thirdly, there is just so much that the private sector can do in taking advantage of 
new trade and investment opportunities and the benefits that come with them.  As 
Hoekman (2005) stresses, governments should play a proactive role in interaction with 
the business community by helping to regulate the financial sector, investing in 
infrastructure projects, creating trade promoting agencies, and adopting overall follow-up 
policies to adapt to the new atmosphere created by the “reallocation” process of 
economic integration.  This will ultimately increase the supply capacity of the private 
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sector so that it can better respond to trade opportunities and more beneficially interact 
with foreign investors.  Moreover, one particular aspect in which the government can 
directly stimulate this process is by not liberalizing in the government procurement area 
and offering these projects exclusively to domestic suppliers, which can further stimulate 
the overall domestic economic activity (see Chapter III for more detail).  
 Summing up, by constructing an alternative approach to traditional PTA analysis, 
it has been shown that closer integrating economically (forming a PTA) can result in 
various potential “dynamic” benefits for DCs.  PTAs might be able to put at the doorstep 
several of these benefits by enlarging the market, and potentially attracting FDI inflows.  
However, there are two conditions if theory is to be put into practice: i) market access 
needs to be actually exploited, which is not necessarily done by simply enlarging the 
market on paper by signing a PTA, and ii) good quality foreign investments need to be 
attracted, which is done by increasing local capabilities.  However, even if these 
conditions are met, the ultimate developmental result from a certain PTA will only 
depend on domestic absorbing and supply capacities to respond to trade and investment 
opportunities and, on the proactive role of the government to shape the desired outcome.   
 With this being said, in the next two chapters, I will test this alternative approach 
by analyzing the actual characteristics of two current PTAs, namely NAFTA and ASEAN 
and its various trade and investment schemes, hoping to capture the developmental 
benefits that Mexico and the ASEAN economies have been able to obtain from closer 








CHAPTER III: MARKET ACCESS ISSUES IN NAFTA AND AFTA 
 
 
 In Chapter II, market access was identified as one of the two vehicles that can 
potentially deliver substantial dynamic benefits to DCs from increased international 
trade.  Thus, improving access to the markets of partner countries is one of the key 
motivations for DCs to pursue closer economic integration by forming a PTA.  
Partially fueled by this line of thought, Mexico embarked on a mission of 
obtaining preferential access to one of the world’s largest markets,47 which was right next 
door, and kick-off its economic development process once-and-for-all by signing 
NAFTA.  Likewise, partially based on the same rationale, but with a more cautious 
approach and with a likely smaller impact – given the market sizes – the ASEAN 
economies formed a Free Trade Area (AFTA).48   
However, after more than a decade from the creation of both agreements, the 
development process of Mexico and that of the ASEAN-10 appears to have been 
differently affected by each respective accord (see Chapter V).  This despite the fact that 
both agreements seem to have had a major impact on the export-flows of both Mexico 
and the ASEAN-10 at the aggregate level (figures III.1 and III.2).  On one hand, the 
 
47 The US and Canada combined registered in 1995, a nominal GDP of US$7.88 trillion, or almost one 
third of the world’s total GDP (UNCTAD, 2006a).    
 
48 AFTA was formed in January 1992, the six initial members were, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.  Vietnam joined AFTA upon its membership in ASEAN in 1995, Lao 
PDR and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999 (for more information on this and other ASEAN 
agreements go to: http://www.asean.org/4920.htm.  The ASEAN-10 combined registered in 1995, a 
nominal GDP of US$ 676 billion, or 2.2% of the world’s total GDP (UNCTAD, 2006a). 
 
increased export-flows in the case of Mexico do not seem to have delivered the economic 
performance results that many expected; instead, the Mexican economy has been 
performing worse than it did during some periods prior to NAFTA (see Chapter V).  On 
the other hand, the increased trading activity during the period of AFTA, especially in the 
last years (figure III.2), seems to have been accompanied by an overall trend of 
significantly positive economic performance by all members, before and during the 
accord, compared to other similar DCs (see chapter V). 






































    Source: Author’s calculations based on UNCTAD (2006a) figures. 
 























      Source: Author’s calculations based on UNCTAD (2006a) figures. 
 
Assuming that, to a certain extent, both accords were responsible for the increased 
export-flows experienced,49 and increased trade can be economically positive, the 
somewhat paradoxical results from Mexico support the presumption at which I arrived in 
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49 In the case of NAFTA, many authors agree that it has been largely responsible for the export growth 
experienced by Mexico after its implementation. For example, see Ramirez (2003) and Krueger (1999b), to 
mention just a couple.  In the case of AFTA, however, there are divided opinions.  For example, Elliot and 
Ikemoto, 2004 (in Lendle, 2007, p. 6) suggest that AFTA had no impact on intra-ASEAN trade.  Other 
studies, such as Cernat (2003) conclude that AFTA has positively influenced ASEAN’s overall trade flows.   
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Chapter II: increased trade/export-flows created by the PTA do not necessarily imply 
improved market access for the goods and services produced in the DC that can 
positively influence its development.  Rather, there must be many other factors and 
circumstances that need to be put in place before and during the negotiating stage, if a 
PTA is to generate greater market access and development.  Otherwise, market access 
opportunities offered by a PTA risk remaining only that – “opportunities”.   
This chapter analyzes and compares crucial market access issues in both NAFTA 
and AFTA.  It also points out the main differences between them, pinning down some of 
the reasons why they have delivered such different results, when the initial purpose was 
to some extent based on the same rationale.  In order to have a meaningful comparison, 
the chapter is divided in three sections: i) the pre-existent circumstances in the run-up of 
the accords’ negotiations, ii) the actual text-structure of each agreement regulating market 
access, and iii) the final market access results generated in some of the most important 
economic sectors for DCs such as, trade in manufactures, agriculture, and services.  
 
3.1. Pre-Existent Circumstances 
 The general approach to improve market access is the elimination of tariffs, and 
non-tariff barriers (NTB) to trade.  However, obtaining access to foreign markets, 
especially for DCs, is a lot more complex than the mere reduction of tariffs and NTBs 
(Chapter II, p. 24).  A country’s economic, social and institutional structure might well 
circumscribe the capacity to respond and capture any market access opportunities.  
Hence, the pre-existent circumstances and potentials of each negotiating member as well, 
 44
                                                
as the asymmetries among, them would likely have a decisive impact on both the final 
text-structure of the accord and the actual results. 
 
A). Bargaining Power: First and foremost, the level of bargaining power (in all 
respects) brought to the negotiating table will definitely draw the direction that any PTA 
will take, as far as drafting the actual text, which oftentimes could lead to a biased 
agreement in favor of the stronger party.  This issue had a stronger impact in the case of 
NAFTA, where the economic muscle of the US and Canada was evident in several 
political and economic areas such as: i) larger and better structured domestic markets, ii) 
greater resources for the actual negotiating team, iii) more influential political and legal 
frameworks that prevent trade negotiators from liberalizing beyond a certain point,50 and 
iv) many and well organized lobbying groups.  Due to these initial disadvantages, Mexico 
might have been forced to undertake a broader and deeper liberalization of its markets in 
order to obtain some preferential access to the US and Canada.51  In fact, this might have 
well eroded a great part of the benefits obtained from the accord.   
In AFTA, the problem of bargaining power was lesser, given the fact that at least 
the five largest members were, and still are, at a similar stage of development and market 
size.52  They had similar negotiating skills, similar economic resources, and similar 
 
50 For example, the US Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002.  See Khor (2007, p. 8).  
 
51 To better illustrate this point Panagariya (1998, p. 45) quotes Fred Bergsten (1997b, p. 26) as follows: 
“NAFTA amounted to a 4% expansion of the American economy, to include a country that accepted 
virtually every demand placed upon it in the negotiations and which made virtually all the concessions.”  
 
52 When NAFTA was negotiated the US economy was about 27 times larger than that of Mexico, US$7.3 
trillion, and US$0.28 trillion respectively.  These asymmetries were smaller in the case of AFTA, 
especially among the five largest AFTA members (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and 
Thailand) (UNCTAD, 2006a).    
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knowledge of their local markets.  The weaker bargaining power aspect might have had 
similar effects on the later AFTA joiners, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia, and also 
Brunei, the smallest economy; however, in AFTA, because it was a far less ambitious 
accord, the impact of harmful concessions was lower for the late joiners of AFTA than 
for Mexico under NAFTA.  
 
B). Initial Tariff Levels: This pre-existing condition will likely have a negative 
impact on most DCs from liberalizing trade, due to the relatively higher tariff levels.53  A 
higher initial tariff rate implies a greater loss of revenue with two adverse effects.  One, 
the lost revenue will offset a great part of the country’s net welfare gains obtained; two, it 
will further exacerbate the government’s financial ability to proactively assist its 
development, (Chapter II, p. 38).  This is because tariff revenue is a very important 
source of the total government’s revenue of many DCs.54
For example, before NAFTA, Mexico applied on average an 11% tariff to its 
future trade partners, compared to a 4% on average of the US and Canada to Mexico 
(UNCTAD, 2007b).55  In the case of AFTA, with the exception of Singapore and Brunei, 
all other founding members entered the accord with a substantially high tariff rate (table 
III.1).  However, it is also interesting to observe in table III.1 that the late AFTA comers 
were permitted to further increase their tariffs for the first years and gradually decrease 
 
53 The average trade-weighted average applied tariff by DCs is 8.1%, compared to 2.9% of developed 
countries (Fugazza and Vanzetti, 2006).  
 
54 For example, Lao-Araya (2002) reports that on average DCs collect 16.15% of their total revenue from 
foreign taxes (tariffs), compared to about 0.89% in average in industrialized countries.  
 
55 Panagariya (1998) reports that the redistributive effects of NAFTA due to its initial high tariff level 
might be costing Mexico as much as US$3.25 billion per year.  
them later.  This has made smoother the initial shock of lost revenue for the weaker 
members, such as Cambodia that collected on average 58.1% of its total revenue from 
tariffs (Lao-Araya, 2002). 
Table III.1. Average Tariff Rate in the ASEAN-10 During AFTA 
  
  Source: Hapsari and Mangunsong (2006) 
 
 
C). Consumption Patterns Differences: TTT predict that a reduction in tariffs 
will increase market access and welfare gains from trade.  However, as discussed in 
Chapter II (p. 17), if markets are differentiated by income levels, the possibilities of 
increasing market access (especially from low to high income markets) are largely 
reduced.  As Mayer and Zignago (2005, p. 1) argue, “while tariffs still have in general an 
influence on trade patterns, our estimates suggest that they are not an important 
component of market access difficulties faced by Southern exporters on Northern 
markets”.  Rather, complementary economies tend to trade more with one another despite 
the level of tariffs applied.   
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Two observations are worth mentioning in regards to NAFTA and AFTA that 
support this argument.  Cuyvers and Pupphavesa (1996) report that AFTA has come 
about from a long historical cooperation among its members through ASEAN, which 
hardly generated any significant trade for the first 25 years or so.  It was mainly due to 
the members’ non-complementary economies.  However, after years of attempting to 
meet each others’ economic needs, intra-regional trade has been steadily increasing 
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during the last decade (Figure III.1 and III.2), due not only possibly to AFTA, but also to 
the gradual complementation of the members’ markets.   
In the case of NAFTA, since the Mexican economy already heavily depended on 
imports from the US before NAFTA,56 the US has greatly benefited from the accord.  
The agreement only made it easier for US exporters to penetrate the Mexican market.  On 
the other hand, Mexico has only been successful in increasing its market access to the US 
on the assembly line, or Maquiladora plants, as I will explore later in more detail.  It 
suffices for now to say that goods from the maquiladora sector can be hardly considered 
“Mexican”, since most parts are imported from the US.57  Most other Mexican products, 
excluding the oil sector, have performed quite poorly in penetrating the northern markets 
of Canada and the US.  This was largely due to the lack of demand of Mexican 
commodities in those markets.   
Some Mexican exporters, mainly exporters in the consumer goods sectors, such as 
typical and regional foods and clothing (i.e. consumer Mexican brands such as Corona, 
Jumex, Marinela, and Bimbo), have increased their market share in the US market since 
NAFTA (Salazar, 2004).  However, they have done so not by capturing American 
consumers, but by serving the increasing demand generated from Mexican emigrants in 
the US that have more than doubled in numbers since the accord took place.58  In other 
words, these Mexican brands have been able to increase their sales to the very same 
domestic consumers that did not have the purchasing power when in Mexico.  Ironically, 
 
56 In 1990, Mexico imported 66.1% of total imports from the US (UNCTAD, 2006a).   
 
57 Calculations suggest that exported goods from the Maquiladora plants on average contain a mere 1-3% of 
locally produced Mexican inputs (see Ramirez, 2003; and UNCTAD, 2007b). 
 
58 Delgado-Wise (2004, p. 594) reports that since NAFTA  the migratory flow over the past decade has 
been 10 times higher than the one recorded 20 years earlier.   
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Mexico had to enter NAFTA to generate an emigration wave and expand market access 
for wholly produced Mexican goods in the US, but American brands such as Coca-Cola, 
Frito-Lay, and even Taco-Bell had long before NAFTA captured the Mexican market.  
 
D). Supply Capacity Constraints: In Chapter II (p. 36), it was concluded that a 
pre-condition in the capturing of opportunities of an enlarged market was the “readiness” 
of a country to do so.  This readiness was composed of the physical infrastructure and 
credit markets available to local producers to respond to the new demand.  However, it 
was also concluded that the average DC, including Mexico and the ASEAN-10, is less 
equipped with adequate infrastructure and credit markets than industrialized countries.59  
In the case of NAFTA, Mexican exporters were faced with US and Canadian exporters 
equipped with widespread and abundant transportation resources and sophisticated 
communications networks.  Most importantly, US and Canadian exporters had at their 
disposal not only domestic strong credit markets, but also, oftentimes, access to 
international credit markets.  Under these circumstances, Mexico might not only have lost 
many trade opportunities, but even worse it might have exposed its domestic markets to 
be swamped by US and Canadian products, further pressing down weak domestic 
producers (Chapter II, p. 37).        
In the case of AFTA, there were many missed out trade opportunities by all 
members, but at least, there was no evident supply-capable member that was able to 
 
59 For example, the US has about 0.67 thousand sq/km of roads and speedways per sq/km of surface 
compared to 0.18 of Mexico.  On average high-income countries have 660 vehicles (both commercial and 
private) per 1000 inhabitants, compared to about 250 on average in DCs.  65% of firms from DCs reported 
infrastructure inefficiency as one of the main obstacles to operate.  High-income countries have on average 
55 telephone lines per 100 inhabitants, as opposed to 13 on average in DCs.  In DCs, on average, 45% of 
firms reported credit access problems as opposed to only 17% in most industrialized countries (World Bank 
Statistics in Infrastructure at: http://www.worldbank.org/ ).  See also Jansen and Lee (2007).  
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swamp the other members’ markets.  Singapore is the only member that might have been 
superior as far as adequate infrastructure and credit markets, but given the small size of 
its economy, it is highly unlikely that it could have an impact such as the one of the US 
on Mexican markets.    
 
3.2. The Texts Governing Market Access   
Large asymmetries in all the abovementioned pre-existing circumstances among 
members of a future PTA will definitely generate different sets of rules and regulations 
governing market access opportunities, which ultimately will determine any 
developmental gains that each member will obtain.  This has certainly been the case for 
NAFTA and AFTA which, although set out to accomplish similar goals, delivered 
somewhat different final results.  Hence, it is important to analyze the main 
characteristics that each agreement embraces as far as market access and to point out the 
main differences that might have led to the different results.  
According to Estevadeordal (1999), there are two basic parts of any market access 
agreement that will dictate and regulate trade among members: i) the preferential tariff 
level to be set and the phase-out schedule (Liberalization Schedule), and ii) the governing 
RoO that will evaluate if a commodity is generated within the borders of a member.  In 
addition, there are some other important features that characterize most PTAs today, 
which will also have an impact on the final results of the agreement.  These include the 
concept of reciprocity, government procurement, and the built-in flexibility that the 
accord offers to the weaker partner to gradually adapt to the initial shock.  All these will 
be discussed in turn below.       
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3.2.1. Liberalization Schedules  
 Estevadeordal (1999) explains that, traditionally, the tariff level in PTAs used to 
be set at a fixed preferential level below the MFN rate.  But the constant unilateral and 
multilateral tariff reductions had the effect of progressively eroding preference margins 
initially agreed upon.  Hence, to maintain those margins over time, countries needed to 
constantly renegotiate the agreement (an issue that AFTA members are currently facing 
as discussed below).  Later on, PTAs were based on constant relative margins of 
preference by negotiating preferential tariff reductions as a percentage of the MFN 
currently applied rates.  In fact, most current PTAs have followed the NAFTA model in 
many respects, moving towards tariff phase-out programs that are relatively quick, 
automatic, and nearly universal.  The tariff elimination process follows pre-specified 
timetables ranging from immediate elimination to up to generally 10 years period phase-
outs, with special phase-out periods for those products regarded as “sensitive”.  These are 
very important features of a PTA, for they permit or hinder, in the short-run, the weaker 
partner to adapt to an initial greater drop of tariff revenue and to increase its 
competitiveness in all the weak sectors before the phase-out period ends.          
In the case of NAFTA, half of its 22 chapters60 regulate and specifically address 
in detail the list of items covered by the agreed tariff rate and when, if included in the 
accord, it applies.  Also in the case of NAFTA, the set tariff rate was straightforward and 
members agreed on a zero tariff rate starting from their respective pre-NAFTA MFN 
applied tariff levels.  The elaborated part of the agreement was the phase-out schedule 
under which parties agreed to phase-out their respective tariffs for the initially excluded 
 
60 For a full copy of the NAFTA Text, go to: http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/naftatce.asp  
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sensitive items.  The parties agreed to put goods into several categories depending on 
their sensitivity to import competition, reflecting the magnitude of liberalization effect as 
well as the political weight of each sector.  The four main NAFTA stages specifying the 
number of equal-size annual cuts until full liberalization were: A (immediate), B (five 
stages), C ten stages, C+ (fifteen stages).61  At the time of implementation on January 1st, 
1994 tariffs for about half of all import categories were eliminated immediately, and most 
of the remaining tariffs were set to disappear within a period of five years.  The most 
drastic phase-out was carried out by Mexico with initial cuts above 50% on average.  The 
US, which had started with low tariffs, implemented an almost immediate full tariff 
liberalization, with the exception of specific sensitive sectors, such as food products, 
textiles, apparel, and footwear manufactures (Estevadeordal, 1999). 
In comparison, the main instrument that regulates market access in AFTA is the 
Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT).  The preferential tariffs rate agreed by 
AFTA members was ambiguously set to 0-5%.  The initial phase-out program was set to 
15 years, but later moved up to 10 years for all members according to the date of 
accession of the CEPT program.62  In a fashion like NAFTA, the CEPT phase-out 
program was also divided in product categories, allowing gradual liberalization. 
However, even in the CEPT inclusion product list there was much less immediate 
liberalization of goods.  There are two phase-out routes for the CEPT inclusion list that 
allow members to immediately liberalize products under the “Fast-Track” or instead to 
 
61 Quote from Estevadeordal (1999, p. 6): “It is interesting to note that it was the United States that insisted 
on C+ category.  This embarrassed the US Chief negotiator who later said “it was as if we were the 
developing country,” reported in Mayer (1999 p. 117).”  
 
62 Vietnam in 1995, Lao and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999.     
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spread out the liberalization process through the initial phase-out schedule of 10 years 
under the “Normal-Track”.  There are three other additional liberalizing categories that 
allow for sensitive products to be excluded from the CEPT program: i) temporary 
exclusions list, which will gradually be reduced by 20%, annually moving these items to 
the general inclusion list over a five years period, ii) sensitive agricultural products, 
which will be extended with a deadline of the year 2010 for their integration into the 
CEPT, and iii) general exceptions, which are permanently excluded from liberalization 
(Cuyvers and Pupphavesa, 1999).      
 There are some important differences in regards to the preferential tariff and the 
phase-out schedules that NAFTA and AFTA have pursued and that would have generated 
the eventual outcomes on market access.  First, the preferential tariff level in NAFTA 
was immediately dropped to zero for a great part of the product groups included in the 
scheme.  This has, without a doubt, had a tremendous initial impact on Mexico, not only 
decreasing the tariff revenue, but also taking the risk of having liberalized too much too 
soon.63  In AFTA, the preferential tariff rate was set to 0-5%, not absolute zero.  On one 
hand, this issue has drawn some negative attention from observers such as Hapsari and 
Mangunsong (2006), who argue that tariffs under the CEPT have been underutilized 
since the weighted preferential tariffs in AFTA were higher than MFN tariffs.  On the 
other hand, it reflects the much relaxed impact of the initial tariff reduction.64  Second, 
 
63 Froot (1989) empirically demonstrates that: “A gradual lowering of trade barriers turns out to be welfare-
superior to an immediate liberalization”.  Also, see Jansen and Lee (2007) for more detail.  
 
64 Note that several authors such as Naya and Imada, 1992, Alburo, 1994, Pangestu, 1994, and Chia, 1994 
(in Cuyvers and Pupphavesa, 1996, p. 10) argue that the transition period in AFTA is too long, and it has to 
be speeded up. Moreover, Baldwin, 2006 (in Lendle, 2007, p. 9) presents empirical evidence on tariff 
underutilization in AFTA.  
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the general phase-out program was set out almost identically, but the range of products 
included was much larger in NAFTA than in AFTA,65 and the broader the liberalization, 
the riskier it can be for the DC, because some weak, yet fundamental sectors might need 
initial protection to not be crowded out by the foreign stronger competition.  Therefore, 
the AFTA more cautious approach to this issue can allow more flexibility to select the 
sectors ready for liberalization.    
 
3.2.2. Rules of Origin  
Because of their discriminatory nature, PTAs must distinguish non-member-
originating from member-originating products in order for a product to be granted 
preferential access.  There are two main features of RoO that would likely play a 
detrimental role in the level of market access obtained by DCs from a PTA: i) they are 
costly and complex to comply with, and ii) according to an increasing literature in many 
PTAs the RoO adopted are protectionist and discriminatory (see below). 
 First, given the fact that a large part of exporters from DCs are Small-Medium-
Enterprises (SMEs), the general restructuring costs generated by trade liberalization can 
be considerably large, and oftentimes these costs go beyond their capacities.  In addition 
to that, in order for exporters of DCs to take full advantage of the new export 
opportunities, sometimes they have to totally redesign their administrative practices to 
produce the required documentation to comply with the complex RoO.  Large exporters 
might be able to internally adopt and implement new software and accounting systems, 
 
65 In fact, as Shimizu (2007, p. 76) points out, “the efficacy of AFTA could not be overestimated”.  
Because, large important sectors were excluded from liberalization, and the regional trade applied by 
AFTA and the CEPT was extremely small.    
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but smaller exporters usually have to outsource the exporting practices (Stiglitz and 
Charlton, 2005).  In both cases, the cost can well offset a great part of the benefits 
obtained from the preferential tariff rate because the total administrative costs imposed by 
the RoO are high due to the obligation of certifications almost always involving both 
public and private spheres.66   
 Secondly, and most importantly, RoO have been identified by many authors to 
embrace hidden protectionism.67  RoO, restrictive beyond a certain point in a PTA, have 
two negative effects: i) they potentially invite members to indirectly protect certain weak 
domestic industries from direct competition from the partner’s more efficient firms, and 
ii) they have been found to have trade diverting effects in many potentially trade creating 
sectors, which is welfare decreasing from a Viner’s perspective (Chapter II, p. 19).   
NAFTA is composed of the largest and most restrictive set of RoO today, which, 
according to many authors, including Hufbauer and Schott (2005), Estevadeordal (1999), 
Panagariya (1998), Ramirez (2003), Kume et. al. (2006), and Cadot et. al. (2005) are 
protectionist, trade diverting, and far beyond the necessary in a PTA.  Indeed, they have 
been identified as one of the main causes for the insignificant market access that Mexico 
has obtained from NAFTA in some of its most competitive manufacturing sectors, like 
textiles and apparel (see next section).   
In contrast, the RoO embraced in AFTA have not been very controversial because 
they are quite simple and straightforward and based mainly on a regional value content 
(RVC), which has been set at 40% according to the “ASEAN content requirement” 
 
66 Some rough estimates suggest that costs of documentation of origin requirements vary between 1.4% and 
5.4% of the export value (Kume et al., 2006). 
 
67 See for example, Krishna and Kruger, 1995 (in Estevadeordal, 1999, p. 6).  
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(CEPT, art. 2.4)68 without any additional regulations (Cuyvers and Pupphavesa, 1996).  
ASEAN origin can be simply obtained and enjoy preferential treatment among the 
members if 40% of the value of a product originated in ASEAN countries and the product 
is included in the CEPT list.  Cuyvers and Pupphavesa (1996) point out that some critics 
argue that AFTA’s RoO are not in accord with international standards, which might 
enable abuses and lead to confusing situations.  Mainly, there are concerns that third 
countries might penetrate the regional market using the free-tariff ports of Singapore and 
Brunei enjoying preferential access to the rest of the area.  However, it has not been a 
topic of much concern since some evidence has discharged such fears (ibid).  
 There are two concrete differences between the RoO in NAFTA and AFTA that 
have impacted Mexico and the ASEAN-10 differently.  First, the simplicity of complying 
with AFTA’s RoO in comparison to NAFTA’s might have been less burdensome for 
AFTA members, allowing them to net larger gains from trade.  Second, the lost market 
access opportunities for AFTA members were likely less than they were for Mexico, due 
to the restrictive and protectionist RoO in NAFTA.  
 
3.2.3. Other Features      
In addition to the two abovementioned characteristics regulating market access in 
PTAs, there are some other important features that will directly influence a PTA’s final 
developmental impact and that are certainly related to the market access issues discussed 
in this chapter.  These include reciprocity, government procurement liberalization, and 
the built-in flexibility embraced in the accord favoring the weaker members.  
 
68 For text copies of RoO and RVC regulation in ASEAN, go to: http://www.aseansec.org/17281.htm .  
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First, in order to comply with the GATT Art. XXIV, most PTAs today embrace 
the concept of reciprocity.  However, as Stiglitz and Charlton (2005) recall, PTAs could 
be relatively more development-friendly if some advantages are provided to the weaker 
members on “non-reciprocal” basis, especially in PTAs where there are large 
asymmetries among members (N-S PTAs).  For example, if NAFTA were to intrinsically 
embrace any development drive, it would have been designed differently.  As UNCTAD 
(2007b) points out, Mexico was expected, or forced, to perform from a much less 
advantageous position on a reciprocal basis with the US and Canada.  On the other hand, 
AFTA is also based on reciprocity, but given the similar stage of development among 
members, this would likely have had a smaller impact for any individual member.  
Besides, smaller AFTA members were given more freedom and flexibility to adopt as 
opposed to the larger initial members (i.e. tariffs, p. 45).  
Secondly, one particular aspect of market access in current PTAs is the inclusion 
of government procurement into the liberalization schedule.  This, as Stiglitz and 
Charlton (2005) report, can have serious development implications given the fact that this 
sector in DCs on average accounts for as much as 20% of their GDP.  Hence, offering 
this demand to local producers can be a significant policy tool that favors weak domestic 
producers and achieves a better balance in the economic weight of various social groups 
and communities within the nation.  On the contrary, if this area is liberalized, the 
government gives up very important policy space to pursue its development goals, as was 
the case when Mexico signed NAFTA in which is included the liberalization of this area.   
In contrast, AFTA does not include the liberalization of this area.  Of course, one 
could argue that Mexican firms have the possibility to bid in US and Canada tender 
 57
                                                
markets, which are much larger than that of Mexico.  However, as UNCTAD (2007b) 
explains, it is very unlikely that a net benefit from market access for government 
procurement will accrue for Mexico, because most Mexican producers lack the supply 
capacity needed for the types of goods and services provided under an average 
government contract.69  There is a very important point that needs to be made here.  
Although market access can be granted in paper by signing a PTA, it is not to be assumed 
that such market access will be actually exploited by the DC.     
Thirdly, one of the most crucial and evident differences between NAFTA and 
AFTA, not only in regards to market access, but in all the areas covered in the 
agreements, is the built-in flexibility that AFTA has had since its formation compared 
with that of NAFTA.  On the one hand, the signing of NAFTA arose in a sudden and 
rushed decision by the Mexican government as it became convinced that profound 
integration into the world economy was the only ticket to national development and that 
the US was the ideal, if not the only, partner to achieve this.  Hence, Mexico sought to 
“lock-in” trade preferences and economic reforms by committing itself to NAFTA.  But 
as Panagariya (1998, p. 22) points out, “if these preferences were harmful to Mexico in 
the first place, the lock is not a benefit but a cost”.  Moreover, as UNCTAD (2007b) 
points out, NAFTA was never set out to eventually further “integrate”, and it might be 
extremely hard to be renegotiated, at least in favor of Mexican development needs.     
On the other hand, AFTA comes from, at least, a longer political cooperation 
between members.  The first attempt to form a PTA was done in 1977.  This was 
 
69 Data from the US Federal Procurement Data System (USFPDS, 2007) reported in UNCTAD (2007b, p. 
60) reports that, in 2005, 94% of payments made by the Federal Government went to companies located in 
the US, leaving only 6% to all suppliers from the rest of the world.  
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eventually replaced with AFTA.  Cuyvers and Pupphavesa (1996) list many other 
initiatives by the AFTA members in their attempts to understand and shape each others’ 
economic needs.  These include, the Basic Agreement on ASEAN Industrial Projects 
(AIP), the Basic Agreement on ASEAN Industrial Complementation (AIC), and the 
Basic Agreement on ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures (AIJV).  These agreements mostly 
failed or were dismissed to make way for AFTA and the CEPT, but the experience 
obtained was invaluable.  Moreover, AFTA itself has been revisited and revised many 
times according to the changing needs of the members.  The phase-out periods have been 
pushed forward, more products have been added for liberalization, and at the same time, 
many countries have fallen behind the initial commitments due national development 
needs.  In addition, unlike NAFTA, ASEAN/AFTA has ambitions to further “integrate” 
and become ultimately an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC).70  
 
3.3. Actual Market Access Outcomes 
 The previous two sections analyzed how certain pre-existent circumstances might 
a priori determine the level of market access that DCs might obtain from a PTA and the 
actual accord’s text that those conditions generated in the case of NAFTA and AFTA.  In 
this section, I will present some of the actual outcomes that NAFTA and AFTA have 
delivered to Mexico and the ASEAN-10 respectively in regards to market access during 
the lifetime of the agreements.   
 
70 As stated on the “Declaration of ASEAN Concord II”, an ASEAN Economic Community is the 
realization of the end-goal of economic integration as outlined on the ASEAN Vision 2020 to create a 
stable, prosperous, and highly competitive ASEAN economic region in which there is a free flow of goods, 
services, investments, and a freer flow of capital, equitable economic development, and reduced poverty 
and socioeconomic disparities by the year 2020 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2003).  See Shimizu (2007) for a 
more detailed discussion of the integration evolvements in ASEAN.     
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As mentioned, development is the main objective for DCs in their pursuit of a 
certain PTA, development that is to make existing sectors more competitive, to acquire 
new endowments, and to improve employment opportunities and living standards.  This 
can be obtained by expanding the market for their competitive sectors and absorbing and 
implementing new technologies and production practices during the integration process.  
However, given their initial capabilities, this process implies the initial concentration on 
unskilled-labor-intensive sectors such as, low-technology-manufactures, agriculture, and 
labor-intensive services.  Eventually, these sectors should be upgraded and new industries 
developed as proof of progressive development.  Otherwise, the development drive of a 
PTA might be questioned.       
 
3.3.1. Market Access in Manufactures    
 Historically, almost the entire manufacturing sector has been controlled by 
industrialized countries; however, the world market share for DCs has been steadily and 
rapidly increasing,71 which reflects the importance of these sectors for DCs as well as the 
necessity to further increase market access in this area.  
 As shown in figures III.1 and III.2, Mexico’s total export-flows have increased 
since NAFTA took effect, especially to the US, which went from 62% of total exports 
during the ‘80s to 86% during the five-year period between 2001-2006 (UNCTAD, 
2007b, p.70).  Although increased export-flows are an economic positive according to 
trade theory, it is also important to note that NAFTA has only increased Mexico’s 
 
71 According to UNCTAD (2006a), the world’s share of exported manufactured goods for DCs has changed 
from 24.3% in 1995 to 35.1% in 2005. 
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dependency on US markets, and hence, its economic performance to become largely 
subject to the rules of NAFTA (Ramirez, 2003).  A great part of this increase occurred in 
manufactures such as textiles and apparel, automobiles and automobile parts, and 
electrical and electronic goods.  The share of these manufactures in total exports went 
from around 30% in the early ‘80s to around 80% in 2006 (UNCTAD, 2007b).  
Nonetheless, as previously mentioned, increased export/trade-flows do not necessarily 
imply improved market access for the sectors that can positively influence the economic 
development of the DC, as I will discuss below.  
 In regards to the textile and apparel industries, the restrictive RoO in NAFTA 
came to play a crucial role on the final market access that Mexico would have obtained 
from these sectors.  Due to the fact that these industries are considered extremely 
“sensitive” for the US, the American textile industry pursued a curious and successful 
strategy regarding its survival by introducing the “yarn-forward-rule” in NAFTA, as 
reported by Destler (in Kume et. al., 2006, p. 10), which forced Mexican producers to 
source raw materials from US producers.  The textile and apparel sectors in NAFTA have 
been identified by some authors (Estevadeordal, 1999, and Kume et. al., 2006) as having 
the most restrictive RoO in NAFTA.  These sectors, which had a large potential to 
generate trade creation due to the high level of protection from all parties, ultimately 
ended up being one of the few industries in which NAFTA has fostered trade diversion.   
Cadot et. al. (2005) have empirically estimated that the apparent market access 
obtained by Mexico in these sectors has, in reality, been largely offset by the costs 
incurred by Mexican producers in adjusting to the new sourcing rules implemented by 
NAFTA.  Hence, although trade flows increased in these industries, not only did Mexico 
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hardly obtain any potential dynamic development benefits from these trade flows, but it 
might even netted welfare losses due to trade diversion. 
 The impressive performance of the automotive sectors is oftentimes referred to as 
novel proof of NAFTA’s success for Mexico.  However, there are two main issues that 
have potentially offset said benefits for Mexico.  First, in NAFTA, the auto sectors have 
the highest RVC, set at 62.5%, which has highly reduced the possibilities of Mexican 
manufactures to source from cheaper suppliers.  This again generates trade diversion 
(Kume et. al. 2006).  Secondly, the automotive industry in Mexico is mostly concentrated 
on the assembly-line process, or the so-called maquiladora programs, which represent on 
average 45% of the total Mexican exports and 52% of manufactured exports, out of 
which 20% are from the auto industry.  However, maquiladora industries are confined to 
labor-intensive assembly type activities with mere 3% domestic inputs.  Although their 
contribution to Mexican GDP and employment has grown from 2% and 1.4% in 1993 to 
6% and 3.4% in 1999, they remain a highly disarticulated sector from the rest of the 
economy and highly dependant and susceptible to the dynamism of industrial production 
in the US (Ramirez, 2003).72    
Such enclave sectors automatically reduce the developmental impact of some 
potential dynamic gains from economic integration (Chapter II, p. 28).  For example, 
backward and forward linkages with domestic producers, which in turn could increase 
economic activity and employment.  While technology transfers might take place 
“within” the sector, its diffusion to the rest of the economy is prohibited (Saggi, 2002).      
 
72 As mentioned by Delgado-Wise (2004), Mexico’s export “miracle” can be largely explained by 
globalization strategies drawn up in Detroit – the U.S. auto industry accounted for approximately one out of 
every five dollars of Mexico’s non-oil exports during 1997.    
 
 In a fashion like NAFTA, AFTA has also significantly increased intra and extra 
export/trade-flows (figures III.1 and III.2).  However, unlike Mexico that is heavily 
dependant on US markets, most AFTA countries, with the exception of Laos and 
Myanmar,73 have a much more diversified export-destination-structure (figure III.3).  
This significantly reduces the dependency on only one external market and, hence, the 
risks of external economic slowdowns.              





















    Source: ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Statistical Yearbook (2005). 
 
Like Mexico, one of the most dynamic export sectors for AFTA members is 
manufacturing, which all together account for 57% of total exports (ASEAN Secretariat, 
2005).  But unlike Mexican manufactures that contained a mere 1-3% of local inputs, 
manufactures from the AFTA area on average employ up to 33% of local inputs 
(UNCTAD, 2006d, p. 187).  The sharp increase of intra-regional trade in these areas is 
mainly due to the successful implementation of the CEPT scheme, which included all 
manufacturing products in its liberalization schedules.  Currently, about 81% of 
ASEAN’s tariff lines are in the inclusion list of the CEPT, a great part of which are 
manufactures.  AFTA has made it possible to increase trade flows for many reasons, but 
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73 Myanmar and Laos destine about 80% of their exports to the AFTA area (ASEAN Secretariat, 2006).  
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certainly a clear reason is the fact that intra-AFTA tariff rates have dropped from 12.76% 
in 1993 to approximately 2.7% in 2003 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2006).       
Proportionally, AFTA has generated less export/trade-flows than NAFTA did for 
Mexico.  However, these exports appear to have had a generally overall positive impact 
on all members, simply because the rules of the game were different and more favorable 
in AFTA than in NAFTA.  There are three main differences worth mentioning that might 
shed some light on this statement.   
First, RoO were by far more relaxed in AFTA than in NAFTA, allowing members 
not only to spend less to comply with them, but also to actually obtain some market 
access to each other’s markets.  Secondly, although AFTA trade flows are concentrated 
in very specific sectors, they are not as evidently concentrated on the same geographical 
region as the maquiladora plants in northern Mexico, which has created a dual economy 
in Mexico, the domestic and the export economy.  Thirdly, AFTA has much more built-in 
flexibility than NAFTA, a very important feature especially for DCs.  For example, in 
AFTA, countries were free to choose what goods to include and when to liberalize them 
throughout the ten-year period.  Mexico had this option for very few sectors.  AFTA also 
includes a “Temporary Exclusion List”, which allows members to temporally exclude 
strategic industries from liberalization even if they were initially included.  This is 
permissible under a Protocol Regarding the implementation of the CEPT Scheme 
Temporary Exclusion List.  Malaysia invoked this protocol in 2000, delaying tariff 
reductions on completely-built-up automobiles, and automobile knock-out kits, in order 
to protect its local auto industry (US-ASEAN Business Council, 2008).  NAFTA has 
nothing similar to this protocol in its market access clauses.       
3.3.2. Market Access in Agriculture 
 Liberalizing the agricultural sector in DCs can be a very tricky maneuver because 
on one hand, it is important to expand markets for domestic producers, but on the other 
hand, local consumers could potentially face extremely high prices due to the inefficient 
domestic markets.  Agricultural reforms, especially in regards to trade liberalization, must 
proceed carefully, for agriculture represents a very important part of both national 
development and daily livelihoods in most DCs.  The agricultural sector in many DCs 
represents almost 40% of their GDP, 35% of their total exports, and most importantly, 
over half of their total employment (Stiglitz and Charlton, 2005) (figure III.4).  
Figure III.4: Employment in the Agricultural Sector  
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    Source: Author’s calculations from UNCTAD (2006a).  
 
  Therefore, DCs with such a high level of dependency in this sector can not afford 
to opt to offer lower prices to domestic consumers, who mostly live in better off urban 
areas, at the expense of the large rural population that depends on the local agriculture for 
survival.  It is especially because the low level of support that DCs can offer the sector to 
increase its production efficiency and capacity to compete internationally.74  Moreover, it 
has to be considered the inefficient labor mobility and nonexistent safety nets that most 
DCs offer displaced workers (Chapter II, p. 16/37).  
                                                 
74 For example, Arroyo Picard et. al. (2003) report that in average industrialized countries spent in 1998 
between US$15, 000 to US$20,000 per full-time farmer, as opposed to around US$1,000 in the few DCs 




                                                
Needless to say, Mexico opted for lower consumer prices in agricultural products 
with the potential displacement of nearly 8 million farmers, approximately 22% of the 
economically active population, that depended on the agricultural sector for mere survival 
before NAFTA (Ramirez, 2003).  This is perhaps the most evident and politically 
sensitive outcome of NAFTA, the near extermination of the agricultural sector in Mexico 
due to the tremendous import-wave of highly-subsidized agricultural products from the 
US after NAFTA’s implementation.75   
The well-known large support of US farmers was expected to have this impact 
against the merely subsistence farmers in Mexico.  Thus, some necessary measures were 
taken in NAFTA in order to help Mexico to adjust its agrarian economy, allowing a 15 
years phase-out period for most of the agricultural sector.  However, as reported by 
Ramirez (2003), 30 months within the accord, the Mexican government decided to 
liberalize the entire sector and stop any financial support.  As a result, imports of corn 
from the US more than tripled and other commodities such as soybean, wheat, poultry, 
and beef rose by over 500%, thereby displacing local production.  The prices of these 
commodities dropped in Mexico by about 48% and more than 2 million farmers were 
displaced and forced to migrate to urban areas or to the US (ibid).  In short, recalling 
Chapter II, by liberalizing agriculture, Mexico has sent the sector from low-productivity 
to zero productivity – unemployment of farmers.   
 In contrast, with the exception of Singapore and Brunei, most of the AFTA 
members also share some of the characteristic of Mexico in the agricultural, such as high 
 
75 In some accounts US subsidies amount to 37% of the value of total agricultural output (United States 
Congressional Budget Office, 2006) (reported in UNCTAD, 2007b, p. 68).  
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export dependency and high employment in the sector.76  However, there are two crucial 
differences that are worth mentioning between NAFTA and AFTA that have likely 
produced the devastating results for Mexico but almost insignificant results on the 
agricultural sectors of the AFTA members: 1) there are no members in AFTA that have 
nearly as highly subsidized agricultural sectors as the US does, so the production 
efficiency and prices were similar in all the members, and 2) AFTA did not liberalize the 
agricultural sectors nearly as much as Mexico did in NAFTA.  Cuyvers and Pupphavesa 
(1996) report that, initially, only processed agricultural products were included in CEPT 
schedule, which broaden the scope years later to further liberalize other agricultural 
products.  Moreover, the CEPT reserves a “Sensitive Agricultural Products List” that 
allows for strategically sensitive products to be excluded indefinitely, if the country 
chooses to do so.  It seems evident that AFTA members opted for the protection of the 
rural population, which depended on agriculture for survival, rather than securing low 
prices for the better off urban population as it was the case of Mexico under NAFTA.  
 
3.3.3. Market Access in Services  
Although the world’s share of DCs in services trade has steadily increased during 
the last fifteen years, it is still a sector largely governed by developed countries.77  
Services are oftentimes a large part of DCs’ total GDP.  Therefore, increasing market 
access for these sectors can be very important for development.  Moreover, Brown, 
Deardorff and Stern (in Stiglitz and Charlton, 2005, p. 52) stress the fact that, since 
 
76 On average the ASEAN-10 employ 48.1% of their population in agriculture (ASEAN Secretariat, 2006).  
 
77 DCs world’s share in traded services has gone from 18% in 1990 to 24% in 2006 (UNCTAD, 2006a). 
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barriers are typically higher in the service sectors, welfare gains from further world 
and/or regional liberalization could deliver much larger gains than liberalization in both 
agriculture and manufacturing.   
However, both NAFTA and AFTA are reciprocal agreements, which means that 
equal concessions have to be given to the trading partners.  As Khor (2007) stresses, it is 
crucial to have a tactical national service plan to understand what services to liberalize, 
and which not to liberalize, if the sector is to have an overall positive impact.  Moreover, 
as discuss in Chapter II (p. 36) and reported by UNCTAD reports (in Khor, 2007), many 
DCs lack the supply capacity to respond to service trade opportunities, such as capable 
human resources, adequate technology, wide telecommunications networks, and overall 
government support for service firms.  Furthermore, UNCTAD notes that DCs, trying to 
export services to developed countries, face difficult barriers such as lack of 
commitments on movement of natural persons, due among others reasons, to strict and 
discretionary visa and licensing requirements and the recognition of qualifications.     
Evaluating the impact of services liberalization is more complex than evaluating 
market access for goods because services trade data are less comprehensive than those of 
merchandise.  A comprehensive discussion on what impact improved market access in 
services could potentially have on development is beyond the scope of this research.  
Rather, I will focus on exploring some of the most crucial clauses and liberalization 
processes that have occurred in NAFTA and AFTA.  Specifically, I will point out some 
of the main differences between both accords and the likely impact that their design 
might have on spurring or hindering the development process of the DCs involved.  
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 Hufbauer and Schott (2005)78 point out that the general impact of trade in services 
in NAFTA was noticeably smaller than merchandise trade flows for the three members, 
not only for Mexico. But thanks to one peculiar clause embraced in NAFTA, the small 
trade in services that took place has permanently harmed Mexico’s domestic economy.  
NAFTA, like many other US accords, takes the “negative-list-approach” (Chapter IV, p. 
75) to services liberalization, which means that all services are included in the 
liberalization, except the ones that are specifically excluded.  Also, UNCTAD (2007b) 
recalls that there is no possible backtrack.   
 In NAFTA, there are three evident samples of miscalculations of Mexico’s service 
liberalization that have had a permanent negative impact.  One was a miscalculation from 
the Mexican negotiators.  Another was a flat out violation by the US.  The final one 
should have been included, but it was not.   
 NAFTA includes provisions for the liberalization of financial services.79  
Hufbauer and Schott (2005) report that, initially, Mexico had negotiated a long phase-in 
period, but chose to accelerate the pace of liberalization on the wake of the peso crisis.  
This resulted in an almost complete take over of the domestic banking sector by foreign 
banks, which might control the sector according to their own interests and not in favor of 
Mexico’s development priorities.  The foreign share of Mexican banking assets has 
increased from 1% in 1994 to 90% in 2001.  The main consequence of this financial 
transformation is a drastic reduction of “connected-lending” motivated by political and 
family relations rather than by sound commercial principles (ibid).   
 
78 Also see, Sen, 2003 (in Lesher and Miroudot, 2005, p. 331).   
 
79 Chapter Fourteen of the NAFTA text: http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/naftatce.asp  
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 Once again, as already mentioned in Chapter II (p. 36), one of the main problems 
as to why DCs do not fully exploit the market access opportunities that PTAs offer is the 
supply capacity constraints that they face.  The supply of adequate transportation services 
is a big step forward in overcoming some of these constraints.  NAFTA was intended to 
gradually allow Mexican trucks to operate in the entire US territory, and vice versa.  This 
would have played a tremendous role on the supply capacity of Mexican producers by 
enabling them to serve the new enlarged market.  Indeed, political foot-dragging and 
judicial challenges indefinitely delayed the implementation of this provision.  In fact, up 
to date the issue is still pending (Hufbauer and Schott, 2005). 
 The immigration issue between Mexico and the US has a long history before 
NAFTA.  Mexico’s scarce social safety nets are not a product of NAFTA.  Traditional 
trade theory clearly points out the fact that trade will undeniably create winners and 
losers.  Given the fact that Mexico has virtually accepted every demand placed upon by 
the US on NAFTA negotiations (large provision on free movement of goods and capital) 
as quoted earlier, at least, some provisions on cross-border movement of unskilled 
workers should have been one of Mexico’s top negotiating priorities.  Unfortunately it 
was not!  That topic was too “hot” to handle in trade negotiations was the official 
response of all the governments involved (Delgado-Wise, 2004).   
Abundant unskilled labor force is one of the main factor endowment differences 
between Mexico and its two developed partners.  The efficient allocation of this resource 
throughout the region could not have brought anything but benefits to the trading bloc.  
Instead, some provisions for the cross-border movement of skilled workers were included 
with very restrictive regulations that have had almost a null impact even for skilled 
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workers.80  The only outcome of this neglected priority was the further increase of illegal 
immigration81 of displaced Mexican farmers to the US and the further brain-drainage of 
the already scarce Mexican skilled labor force.  Again, as I continue to argue in this 
thesis, the development drive of current PTAs is not determined by theory, but by the 
outcomes of the negotiations.   
 In a similar fashion, AFTA has not been much more successful than NAFTA in 
creating market access opportunities for its members in the services sectors.  This is quite 
unfortunate since many AFTA economies, such as the economy of Singapore (60% of its 
GDP), are heavily dependant on services.  The rest all have in average from 40% to 50% 
of their GDP in these sectors (ASEAN Secretariat, 2006).  However, unlike NAFTA, if 
AFTA has not created any real opportunities in this sector, at least it has not delivered 
any negative results as in the case of Mexico.  This has to do mainly with the modus 
operandi AFTA adopted to regulate trade in services.   
Basically, AFTA’s regulation of services is based on GATS regulations with some 
“Plus” provisions, which means it operates under the positive list approach.82  Services 
liberalization in AFTA has made some slow, but substantial progress on a “request-offer-
approach” basis.  According to ASEAN Secretariat (2007a), five packages of 
liberalization have been passed, which comprise important services industries, such as 
 
80 NAFTA provides for the so-called TN Visa allowing skilled Mexican workers to enter the US for 
temporary work.  The annual cap was placed at 5,500 for Mexican workers, but was left unlimited for 
Canadian workers (Hufbauer and Schott, 2005).  
 
81 Calculations in Hufbauer and Schott (2005) state that, the number of Mexican emigrants to the US has 
more than double in the period of 1991-2000 going from an annual average flow of 165,584 yearly 
emigrants to 224,942.  
 
82 In a positive list approach “all” sectors are excluded from liberalization, only the ones listed for inclusion 
get liberalized (UNCTAD, 2006c). 
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tourism, telecommunications, maritime-transport, financial services, construction, air-
transport, distribution, business services, and education.  Moreover, unlike NAFTA, the 
liberalization and harmonization of services in some crucial areas, such as land transport 
and professional licenses recognition, has made some substantial progress.  For example, 
agreements have been made to recognize in all member countries professional licenses to 
facilitate the free movement of service providers in the areas of engineering and nursing.  
Also, an agreement is being negotiated to facilitate land transport across borders 
(ASEAN Secretariat, 2007a).  
Without a doubt the impact of liberalization in services in NAFTA and AFTA has 
been different.  On one hand, the liberalization of services not only brought zero benefits 
to Mexico as far as increasing market access and spurring its economic development, but 
in some instances this liberalization was harmful.  This was mainly due to the negative 
list approach that NAFTA embraced and to the supply capacity constraints of Mexico in 
this sector.  The consequences are that Mexico completely rendered its domestic banking 
sector to foreign capital and it has missed out the opportunity to efficiently allocate its 
most abundant factor endowment (labor), generating an ever-increasing emigration flow 
to its northern partners (mainly the US).  AFTA members, on the other hand, have not 
made much progress on benefiting from the potential of liberalizing trade in services, but 
they certainly have progressively approached the matter in a strategically beneficial 
fashion, and at least, AFTA has not have had any significant negative results. 
With this, in the next chapter, I strive to explore the potential developmental gains 
that foreign investment have, or could have, delivered to Mexico and to the ASEAN-10, 
mainly based on the discussion presented in Chapter II.  
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CHAPTER IV: FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN NAFTA AND ASEAN 
 
 
 Once again, I would like to recall the discussion in Chapter II, where it was 
recognized that foreign investment (mainly in the form of FDI) has the noticeable 
potential, at least in theory, of delivering various dynamic developmental benefits to the 
host economy.  However, it was also emphasized that the “amount” of developmental 
benefits created was largely determined by the “quality”, rather than the “quantity”, of 
such investments, which in turn will be subject to the factors that attracted them in the 
first place (strategy).  Most importantly, it was stressed that the realization of such 
benefits mostly depends on the host economy’s absorbing capacities and the proactive 
role of the government to shape the outcome.  
According to UNCTAD-World Investment Report (2006d), global inflows of 
foreign investments have marked a third consecutive year of growth in 2006, raising to 
US$1.3 trillion and almost reaching the record level of US$1.4 trillion achieved in 2000.  
However, the lion’s share is still directed to industrialized countries, which attracted 66% 
of it.  Although the share of DCs has also increased, they are still lagging behind. 
 There are many factors, mainly domestic policies and capabilities, that have been 
proven efficient in attracting foreign investments, as discussed in Chapter II.83  However, 
getting these factors synchronized and improving the country’s attractiveness for foreign 
investments is not a simple task to achieve, especially for DCs.  Instead, during the last 
 
83 See for example, UNCATD (1999); Miyamoto (2003); and Plummer and Cheong (2008); and Lall and 
Narula (2004) for a more extensive discussion on FDI determinants.   
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decade or so, entering International Investment Agreements (IIAs) has gained in 
popularity among DCs in efforts to attract foreign investors (UNCTAD, 2006b).  These 
agreements, which oftentimes function as a sort “investment-insurance-policy”, 
alleviating foreign investor’s concerns in regards to DCs’ economic, political, and legal 
reliability, are pursued by DCs in hope of increasing their credibility as attractive 
destinations for foreign investments. 
The efficiency of IIAs as foreign investment magnets is a matter of current 
disputes, as previously mentioned, and further discussing the issue is beyond my scope 
here.84  However, it is important to stress the fact that their rapid proliferation85  is of 
serious concern, for it could potentially trigger a race-to-the-bottom effect putting at risk 
national development strategies (Stiglitz and Charlton, 2005).  Moreover, UNCTAD 
(2006c) warns of the fact that commitments in these agreements significantly reduce the 
policy-space flexibility available to domestic governments in meeting their development 
goals.   This negative consequence of IIAs is oftentimes neglected by DCs, that try to 
offer the best investor-concessions in order to attract them, overlooking the fact that this 
could well offset many of the benefits of foreign investments, since these concessions 
stipulate foreign investors’ rights, but hardly ever address their obligations.   
This chapter evaluates and compares the effects that the formation of AFTA and 
the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA)86 have had on foreign investment patterns in the 
 
84 For further discussion, see for example, Plummer and Cheong (2008) and Lesher and Miroudot (2005).     
 
85 According to UNCTAD (2007a), in 2006 there were more than 2,500 BITs, and 240 PTAs that included 
investment provisions.  Moreover, UNCTAD (in Stiglitz and Charlton, 2005, p. 150) reports that DCs are 
quite active in entering IIA at all levels, accounting for 42% of total new BITs in 2001.   
 
86 AIA was formed in October of 1998 by the ASEAN member countries (at the time) to promote intra-
foreign investment inflows (see below), for more detail go to: http://www.aseansec.org/6462.htm .  
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ASEAN-10 and the effects that the inclusion of investment provisions in NAFTA has had 
on Mexico’s foreign investment.  An analysis and comparison of the commitments and 
concessions in each respective agreement will allow me to assess the strategy’s efficiency 
in attracting more and better foreign investments and also to determine the amount of 
potential development benefits that could have been created from the quantity and quality 
of such investments, notwithstanding the fact that the ultimate realization of those 
benefits will depend on the DC itself.   
The first section, mainly based on UNCTAD (2006b), summarizes some of the 
most important characteristics in IIAs in order to offer a general understanding of the 
developmental implications of these schemes, reflecting the price that DCs (in this case 
Mexico and the ASEAN-10) have to pay in order to attract foreign investment.  The 
second section thoroughly reviews how Mexico and the ASEAN-10 sought to attract 
foreign investment under their respective accords (strategy), how much foreign 
investment (quantity) these strategies attracted, and finally what type of foreign 
investment was attracted and to what sectors (quality).  This analysis should contribute to 
the overall assessment of the developmental impact that foreign investment has had on 
Mexico and the ASEAN-10 during their respective accords.   
 
4. 1. Common Characteristics of IIAs      
 According to UNCTAD (2006b), there is long list of clauses and characteristics 
that most current IIAs include and which regulate the flow of foreign investment between 
home and host economies.  From a development perspective, they function as the 
determinants of the final impact and direction that foreign investment inflows will have 
 75
                                                
or take once the agreement has been signed.  It is also important to note that most IIAs do 
not include backtrack clauses in the case of miscalculation and/or underutilization of the 
clauses.  These specific features of IIAs can be an efficient tool that can be used to attract 
foreign investment by “locking-in” favorable concessions for international investors.  At 
the same time, they oftentimes go against the developmental strategies of many DCs, as 
already motioned.  Following is a list of some of the most important characteristics that 
might have a direct impact on the development benefits that increased inward FDI could 
or would have on the host economy.87  
 
A). The Negative-List-Approach: As explained by UNCTAD (2006c), this 
approach to investment treaties offers many opportunities because it tactically allows 
negotiators to pick and choose what sectors to liberalize to foreign investment and under 
what conditions.  At the same time, it requires a far more sophisticated set of negotiating 
skills, administrative resources, and information available, if it is to be utilized positively.  
However, in the case of DCs, it could be a disadvantage since they traditionally lack all 
of the above.  Hence, there could be potential misutilization of the scope of the agreement 
on the exceptions that need to be made in crucial sectors for development (see Lesher and 
Miroudot, 2005 for further discussion).  
Therefore, a positive list approach could be better managed by DCs when entering 
IIAs, especially with developed partners that possess far reaching capabilities (N-S 
PTAs).  Unfortunately for Mexico, NAFTA’s investment provisions embrace the 
negative list approach as opposed to AIA that embraces the positive list approach. 
 
87 See UNCTAD (2006b) for full list of IIAs features.  
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B). Expropriation Clauses: A justifiable major impetus in the negotiation of IIAs 
is to obtain protection for foreign investments against expropriation by the host country, 
which is widely accepted in customary international law.88  However, the drawback of 
this clause in IIAs is not concerned with “direct” expropriation, but rather, with the 
interpretation of “indirect” expropriation, which is included in some IIAs like NAFTA’s 
Art. 1110.89  This is quite dangerous since it can be abused by TNCs against local 
governments, which in turn hesitate to pass any change of laws regarding the directing of 
such investments in line with domestic development projects in areas such as the 
environment and health (Arroyo Picard et. al., 2003).       
A broad interpretation of “indirect” expropriation further guarantees foreign 
investors protection but hardly addresses their obligations.  Indeed, NAFTA’s Art. 1110 
and its broad interpretation of “indirect” expropriation has generated a very significant 
number of investors-state disputes between investors and governments in the NAFTA 
countries.  A report issued by Public Citizen in 2005 reports 42 cases of claims filed 
against all three NAFTA parties by foreign investors with a total worth of US$28 billion.  
The Mexican government has been the most affected of the three NAFTA governments, 
with a total of 43% of the claims against, or 18 cases worth almost 50% of the total 
awards to investors, US$16.5 billion out of a US$35 billion total.90  The US has also been 
sued by foreign investors (mostly Canadian), but according to the same report, the US has 
 
88 The UN Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of State, (GA Res. 3281 (xxix), UN GAOR, 29th Sess., 
Supp. No. 31 (1974) 50) fully recognizes the rights against expropriation without full compensation.   
 
89 For a full description of this article go to: http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/chap-111.asp#A1110 .  
 
90 See Public Citizen Report (2005) for further detail on particular cases, awards, and general information 
on the subject.  Also Arroyo Picard et. al. (2003) present a detailed analysis of the implications that these 
cases have had on Mexico. 
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not lost a single case.  It reflects the importance of a capable legal system available in the 
host country to face the extensive legal resources that many TNCs possess.   
These results have been possible thanks mainly to the general state of the art 
dispute settlement mechanism embraced by NAFTA and, specifically, to the arbitration 
consent clause in investor-state disputes (NAFTA’s Art. 1122).91  These concessions 
largely reduced the policy space available to the Mexican government to strategically 
direct inward foreign investments towards its development efforts.          
 In contrast, ASEAN does not specifically addresses dispute settlement 
mechanisms in the corpus of AIA.  In fact, as reported by Cuyvers and Pupphavesa 
(1996), it has been the subject of several critics in regards to its loose overall dispute 
settlement mechanism, which decreases the ASEAN-10’s overall credibility and 
attractiveness as foreign investment destination.  In response to these critics, ASEAN 
members embraced in 1996 the “Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism”, which was 
later revisited in 2004 by the “ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism” (ASEAN Secretariat, 1996).92  
 
C). Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) and National Treatment: In short, the MFN 
and National Treatment clauses in IIAs imply that foreign investors enjoy the same 
conditions applied to both national investors and/or the conditions, when more favorable, 
applied to any other foreign investor that is not part of the agreement.  This potentially 
limits the government’s policy space to favor national investors which most of the times 
 
91 For an original version of this article go to: http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/chap-112.asp#A1122  
 
92 Go to: http://www.aseansec.org/16654.htm for a detailed version of these agreements.  
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are already at a disadvantage against TNCs that enjoy the size effect and better access to 
international capital markets.  For this reason, an increasing number of countries involved 
in IIAs oftentimes delimit this concession only to the MFN omitting national treatment to 
foreign investors (UNCTAD, 2006b).   
Unlike NAFTA that includes both clauses (NAFTA’s Art. 1102-1103 
respectively),93 AIA only includes the MFN clause (Art.8.1),94 though the members have 
committed to include the national treatment clause in all the included investing sectors in 
AIA after 2010 (ASEAN Secretariat, 1998).  Moreover, some AIA members, such as 
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore on their individual external IIAs, do not 
include the national treatment clause and/or do so only in strategically selected sectors in 
which national investors would not be able to meet the investment requirements needed 
to promote the development of those sectors (UNCTAD, 2006b).  This strategy reflects a 
proactive involvement of local governments in beneficially directing inward FDI.      
 
D). Performance Requirements: This clause is perhaps the most important 
mechanism that DCs can embrace in IIAs, allowing them to have some sort of strategic 
direction of FDI towards meeting their development goals.  For example, the 
implementation of performance requirements can help to ensure that FDI contributes to 
employment, to the overall economic activity in the host economy (creating forward and 
backward linkages), and to facilitate technology transfers by requiring foreign investors 
to act in line with the country’s development, and not only on their own interests.   
 
93 For original text go to: http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/chap-111.asp#A1102.  
 
94 For original text go to: http://www.aseansec.org/7994.pdf .  
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This clause, however, is incompatible with the national treatment clause, which 
releases the foreign investor from any requirements that local investors are not subject to.  
Mexico, obviously, by embracing the MFN and national treatment of foreign investors 
under NAFTA, has given up the possibility of ensuring that foreign investment projects 
are favorable to its development process.95  On the other hand, many ASEAN countries, 
not having committed to national treatment to foreign investors, have had the opportunity 
to strategically use this clause to direct inward FDI and to ensure it has a positive impact 
on the economy.  Moreover, some ASEAN schemes such as ASEAN Industrial 
Cooperation Scheme (AICO),96 which I discuss in greater detail later, do have specific 
performance requirements and investor obligations.  In fact, most projects entering the 
ASEAN zone in the manufacturing sector have to be, at least, previously approved by the 
host economy (see below). 
    
E). Transfer of Funds or “Transfer-Pricing”: Suppose that corporate taxes are 
higher in the host economy of a certain FDI project than in the home economy.  This 
invites foreign investors to remit their profits to the home country.  This situation could 
have a negative impact on the host economy because, if TNCs are able to extract their 
profits via intra-company transactions at artificial prices, the benefits of foreign 
investment to the host economy are accordingly reduced (UNCTAD, 1999).  In addition, 
UNCTAD (2006b) reports that allowing free transfers of funds from foreign investors is 
 
95 NAFTA Art. 1106 prohibits any type of performance requirement as specifically stated on the full text of 
the article, go to: http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/chap-111.asp#A1106 .  
  
96 AICO was agreed upon at the informal ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting in April 1996 and came 
into effect in November 1996 in each ASEAN country, go to: http://www.aseansec.org/6400.htm.  
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of further concern to the host economies, especially when foreign exchange reserves are 
low.  For example, if a foreign investor seeks to transfer a large amount, it further 
depletes exchange reserves needed for other purposes.  Another concern is that, 
permitting free transfers might result on a massive capital flight during time of economic 
difficulty, thereby, exacerbating the host country’s problems.   
Article 1109 of NAFTA97 explicitly allows members to freely transfer funds at 
any times without restrictions.  On the other hand, AIA specifically addresses the issue in 
article 1598 to safeguard the balance of payment, allowing host economies to invoke this 
article in case of emergencies in regards to the concerns mentioned above.  
 
F). Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Protection: Although IPR protection is 
not specifically included as part of IIAs,99 it does, however, directly affect the beneficial 
outcomes from inward FDI, such as the level of technology transfers that can take place 
among the trading partners.  Therefore, it is more than relevant to discuss the issue in this 
section.  The argument regarding adequate protection of IPR and development is 
extremely complex, and adequately discussing it is beyond the scope of this thesis (see 
Lall and Albaladejo, 2002).  Rather, I will only point out some general implications of 
IPR protection on development and what has been the approach of NAFTA and ASEAN. 
 
97 For original text go to: http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/chap-111.asp#A1109 .  
 
98 For a full text of AIA art. 15 go to: http://www.aseansec.org/7994.pdf.  
 
99 Rather, IPR protection, in most PTAs, is included as a separate part of the agreement as a characteristic 
of “deep-integration” and “new-regionalism” (Chapter I).  IPR protection packages are included in PTAs 
for different reasons.  For example, in N-S PTAs, such as NAFTA, IPR protection packages are accepted 
by the DC in exchange with other benefits – for example, market access.  In S-S PTAs, IPR protection is 
less important for any member; hence, it usually takes the form of loose side agreements.     
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The general available literature on IPR protection and development, at best, has 
generated the typical answer in economics: “it depends”.  In this case, whether strong or 
lax IPR protection has a positive impact on development “depends” on the country’s 
level of development.  This means that an economy at an advanced level of development 
will benefit from strong IPR protection, and less developed economies will probably 
benefit from lax IPR protection.  For example, lax IPR protection allows DCs to imitate 
and reverse engineer to upgrade their technological base, after a threshold is passed,100 
strong IPR protection can become beneficial by stimulating new private innovation.  This 
suggests that the forerunners in technological change (industrialized countries) will 
benefit the most from strong IPR protection 
According to UNCTAD (2006b), there are two main approaches to the adequate 
protection of IPR in most IIAs.  First, negotiating members of the agreement opt for 
adopting the already existent international standards, such as the WTO Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).  Second, some accords go beyond 
international standards and opt for creating their own set of IPR regulations. 
In the case of ASEAN, IPR protection mainly falls under the first category.  
ASEAN members have been continuously promoting the importance of IPR protection 
for the sake of technological and economic advancement,101 but have not gone far from 
their TRIPS obligations, and take instead a rather lax approach.  The ASEAN-10 mainly 
regulate IPR protection and promotion though the “ASEAN Framework Agreement on 
 
100 Lall and Albaladejo (2002, p. 6) identify the turning point to be US$7,750 per capita income in 1985 
prices.  These authors refer to other studies such as, Chang (2001) and Rasiah (2001) for further detail.  
 
101 Lall and Albaladejo (2002) point out that the creation and diffusion of new knowledge are desirable and 
beneficial for growth; hence, it is necessary to trade off static optimization in favor of dynamic 
considerations, inducing private agents to invest in the production of new knowledge.  
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Intellectual Property Cooperation”,102 which mainly revolves around the obligations in 
the TRIPS agreement.   
In contrast, NAFTA goes far beyond the regular requirements of TRIPS, adapting 
its own rules for IPR protection (NAFTA’s Chapter, 17).103  This has had an extra 
negative impact on Mexico, not only from extra costs implementing a national set of laws 
that fit both the TRIPS agreement and NAFTA’s regulations, but it also significantly 
reduces the potential of benefiting from any technological spillovers due to the strict 
regulations concerning patents, copyrights, and trademarks from its developed trading 
partners (Arroyo Picard ed. al., 2003).    
 
4.2. Foreign Investment Evolvements     
Mexico and the ASEAN-10 have both opted for the PTA-Formation-Strategy to 
attract foreign investment as stated in their respective objectives.104  The overall real 
efficiency of this strategy in both instances is, however, a matter of dispute.  On the one 
hand, FDI stocks in both instances seem to have been accumulating at a faster pace since 
the respective accords took place, suggesting that on average inflows have indeed 
increased (figure IV.1).  But on the other hand, some economists105 argue that the 
respective accords were not the reason for such increase, but rather that many other 
factors that were taking place at the same time, such as world investment trends.  
 
102 For a full text version of this agreement go to http://www.aseansec.org/6414.htm.  
 
103 For a full text version of this chapter go to: http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/naftatce.asp. 
 
104 AIA Art. 3(i) at: http://www.aseansec.org/7994.pdf), and NAFTA Art. 102(c) at: 
http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/chap-01.asp#Chap.I).    
 
105 In the case of NAFTA, see for example, Arroyo Picard et. al. (2003) and Ramirez (2003).  For the 
ASEAN schemes, see for example, Plummer and Cheong (2008). 
Figure IV.1. FDI Stock Evolution: 1995-2006 
   




         Source. Author’s calculations from UNCTAD (2006d) data.  
 
However, this issue of quantity is not of much relevance to the scope of this 
research  Rather, the quality and direction given to such investments is what counts the 
most for development, as it has been discussed throughout this thesis and stressed by 
some economists including Lall and Narula (2004).  Moreover, the overall ultimate 
impact on development will not be determined by the quantity and/or quality of foreign 
investment, but could be further influenced by the commitments and concessions 
embraced in each accord as discussed previously, where bargaining power and 
asymmetries among members, once again, will play a determinant role in drafting a 
development-friendly accord.  
By grouping the main characteristics of each agreement (see the previous section), 
a clear difference can be observed between NAFTA’s investment provisions and the 
ASEAN-10 investment schemes.  On the one hand, by accepting certain conditions on 
regulating inward foreign investment under NAFTA, Mexico seems to have adopted a 
passive and general full liberalization of foreign investment with little or no restrictions at 
all, thereby relying on market forces to do a government’s job.106  On the other hand, the 
ASEAN-10 seem to have taken a more cautious and conservative approach to foreign 
                                                 
106 Ramirez (2003, p. 874) quotes an ECLAC (2002) report in which is expressed that …”of the 704 
(sectors) listed in the Mexican Classification, 606 are fully open to foreign capital, as share of up to 49% is 
permitted in 35 others, prior authorization from the National Foreign Investment Commission (CNIE) is 




                                                
investment liberalization in order to leave some space for the governments to play a 
proactive role in directing it.   
Hence, in this section, it is necessary to analyze the different approaches in order 
to confirm the above deduction and to access each strategy’s efficiency in attracting more 
and better foreign investment that would ultimately enhance their development.  This can 
be done by posing simple but essential questions: i) how and how much foreign 
investment has each strategy attracted?, and ii) what type of foreign investment have they 
attracted, from whom, and to what sectors? 
 
4.2.1. How and How Much Foreign Investment was Attracted?    
 One of Mexico’s key objectives in NAFTA was to attract foreign investment, not 
only from its trade partners, but from the rest of the world, as documented by some 
authors including Tornell and Esquivel (1997), and it accomplished it.107  It was mainly 
due to the very favorable conditions offered to investors, especially to US and Canada 
invertors, but also to a lesser extent to extra-NAFTA investors.  Mexico’s principal tool 
in the NAFTA accord to attract foreign investment is Chapter 11,108 which embraces one 
of the most favorable set of investment conditions that exist today.  It embraces a large 
scope of coverage for sectors to be liberalized (the negative list approach).  It includes the 
MFN and national treatment principle (Art. 1102 and 1103).  It guarantees a minimum 
standard treatment to investors (Art. 1105).  It does not include any performance 
 
107 Waldkirch (2003) and The World Bank (2003) (in Lesher and Miroudot, 2005, p. 32) report a clear 
positive effect of NAFTA on FDI in Mexico, and suggest that this positive effect has come almost 
exclusively from raising investment from Canada and the United States, rather than from other countries 
wishing to access the NAFTA market.   
 
108 For a full text version of Chapter 11 go to: http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/naftatce.asp.  
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requirements (Art. 1106).  It includes few exceptions (the most important exception of 
the accord is the National Oil Industry (PEMEX)).109  It allows free transfer of funds 
(Art. 1109).  It includes a direct and indirect expropriation clause (Art.1110).  Investors 
from the NAFTA area enjoy a quite reliable dispute settlement mechanism.  And it 
includes many other investor rights with little mention to their obligations.110
Moreover, as already mentioned, the favorable trends of world’s investment 
inflows and being one of the largest developing economies has allowed Mexico to 
increase its foreign investment stock from about US$41 billion in 1995 to US$228 billion 
in 2006 (figure IV.1).  To what extent NAFTA is responsible for this is a matter of large 
disputes based on two grounds.  Firstly, it is argued that NAFTA had not much to do in 
attracting more foreign investment and that other internal factors and world trends were 
the main reasons, even though, disentangling one from the other has proven to be a 
challenging task (Ramirez, 2003).  Secondly, it is simply argued by some economists that 
there was no real increase of inward foreign investment during the period of NAFTA in 
comparison to previous periods, but that there was an annual average decrease.111  The 
only thing that NAFTA is responsible for is the type of foreign investment that came into 
Mexico (Arroyo Picard et. al., 2003, p. 42) (see below).       
 On the other hand, the ASEAN-10 have for a long time been important 
independent recipients of foreign investment, especially the five founding members 
 
109 For a full list of exceptions go to: http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/anx3mex.asp .   
 
110 See Lesher and Miroudot (2005) for a more detail discussion on NAFTA’s investment provisions.  
 
111 Base on data from Mexico’s National Bank, Arroyo Picard et. al. (2003, p. 42) report that yearly average 
foreign investment inflows to Mexico were higher during the period before NAFTA than during the period 
of NAFTA, US$16.5 billion and US$15 billion per year in average, respectively.  
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(Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines).112  However, as Cuyvers 
and Pupphavesa (1996) point out, at the beginning of the ‘90s, the ASEAN economies 
perceived the threat of investment diversion due to the rise of China and other East and 
South Asian countries that were perceived as attractive destinations for foreign investors, 
bypassing many of the advantages that these economies previously enjoyed.  Hence, “re-
attracting” foreign investment for the founding members and attracting more foreign 
investments for late comers (Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam) were the 
key motivations to form AFTA, AIA, and AICO, in order to better compete with other 
emerging economies in the region.  As Plummer and Cheong (2008) state, the intent was 
to form a “one-stop investment center” with a broader, and more integrated production-
base, offering investors the opportunity to reap larger benefits from scale economies, 
transaction costs reduction, and vertical integration of production.   
As Mexico did in NAFTA, the ASEAN-10 intended to attract intra-bloc 
investments, but for the ASEAN-10, it was more important to attract extra-bloc 
investments, which are the largest source in the area (figure IV.6).113  Unlike NAFTA, 
however, ASEAN members embraced a lesser attractive structure on their respective 
schemes as far as freedom and concessions to foreign investors (see previous section).    
ASEAN members created two main schemes to attract intra and extra-bloc foreign 
investments, namely AIA and AICO.  AIA is the main tool in promoting general 
investments in all sectors included in the accord, which can be compared to NAFTA’s 
 
112 Plummer and Cheong (2008, p. 2) report that during the mid-‘90s ASEAN countries accounted for about 
8% of world inflows, but dropped to 4% in recent years due to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.  
 
113 In the period of 1995-2004, 86.4% of FDI inflows into the ASEAN area were extra-ASEAN compare to 
only 11.6% of intra-ASEAN FDI inflows (ASEAN Secretariat, 2005) (see figure IV.6). 
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investment provisions.114  But unlike NAFTA, this scheme embraces, on the one hand, 
less friendly concession to foreign investors, but on the other, it leaves more policy space 
for the respective governments to direct these investments.   
In addition, ASEAN members have also formed another scheme (AICO), which is 
strategically designed to attract foreign investment into the industrial sectors, in hopes of 
enhancing their technological bases from countries such as Japan, the US, and the EU.  
AICO is open to any ASEAN-based company meeting the following requirements: 1) the 
company is incorporated in and operates in an ASEAN country, 2) it included a minimum 
of 30% ASEAN equity, and 3) the company engages in some form of resource sharing, 
such as the sharing of technology, market sharing, or consolidated purchase of raw 
materials.  There are two important principles in this scheme.  One, it is directed to the 
industrial sectors, and two, it embraces some sort of performance requirements to 
maximize the benefits to the ASEAN-zone.  Moreover, each ASEAN member has been 
constantly pursuing individual strategies to improve their economic environment and 
attract foreign investment (ASEAN Secretariat, 1997).  
 As reflected in figure IV.1, it appears that, to a certain extent, these schemes and 
the unilateral initiatives taken have positively influence the ASEAN-10 FDI stock, rising 
from around US$148 billion in 1995 to US$420 billion yearend 2006.  However, some 
empirical studies suggest that the correlation of the ASEAN schemes has been less 
evident and more ambiguous than in NAFTA.  For example, Jeon and Stone (2000) find 
that the ASEAN schemes have had an insignificant impact on FDI flows, both intra and 
 
114 AIA is mostly directed to intra-bloc investment promotion; however, by further harmonizing ASEAN 
investments as whole, AIA could also be a positive force to attract extra-bloc investment.  AIA currently 
covers five sectors: manufacturing, agriculture, fishery, mining, and quarrying, as well as services 
incidental to the five sectors (“Service incidental”) (Plummer and Cheong, 2008).     
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extra-bloc.  Nonetheless, Plummer and Cheong (2008) find that AIA, in particular, has 
had an insignificant impact on extra-bloc FDI flows, but has influenced significantly and 
positively intra-bloc flows.  Moreover, an independent research carried out by the 
ASEAN Secretariat in April 2007, “Completing the AIA – Road Traveled, Road Ahead”, 
states that AIA has had an overall positive effect on FDI flows, especially in recent years.   
To sum up, despite of the fact that there are many other factors influencing FDI 
flows and that it is quite difficult to disentangle one from another, it appears that both the 
ASEAN-schemes and NAFTA’s investment provisions have positively impacted inward 
FDI flows to Mexico and to the ASEAN-10 (increasing quantity).  However, it also 
seems that NAFTA has had a more evident influence on inward FDI flows than the 
ASEAN schemes, suggesting that Mexico’s strategy might have paid off better in terms 
the quantity attracted.  However, the costs involved in doing it, in terms of policy 
reduction, might have also been higher.  In other words, Mexico opted for a strategy that 
will allow it to increase FDI quantity, and the ASEAN-10 opted for a strategy that allows 
them to regulate FDI flows while increasing the quantity.     
  
4.2.2. What Type of Investments and Where Did They go? 
 Again, as already mentioned, from a development perspective, what matters the 
most is quality rather than quantity.  Therefore, a better assessment of foreign investment 
can be done by analyzing its qualitative features and the direction it has taken within the 
host economy(s) in this case Mexico and the ASEAN-10.  There is no “stylized” method 
to evaluate foreign investment’s “quality”, but an attempt can be made by observing 
some key factors, such as the type of investment and activity sought by foreign investors, 
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the countries where those investments come from (developed or developing countries), 
and the sectors in which these investments were made.  It is also important to note that 
the quality of such investments will be largely determined by the initial local capabilities 
of the host country, and the proactive involvement of local governments will be essential 
to give these investments the “right” direction.    
      
A). Portfolio Investments: It was concluded in Chapter II (p. 25) that it is not 
quite clear how portfolio investments affect the host economy.  Moreover, as pointed out 
by Hufbauer and Schott (2005), these types of investments are harder to calculate because 
longitudinal data on them is scarce and unreliable.  Hence, an adequate discussion on 
portfolio investments in NAFTA and ASEAN will not be presented here.  Nonetheless, 
there is an important difference between NAFTA and AIA worth mentioning in order to 
illustrate the potential impact that portfolio investments might have had in both cases. 
AIA specifically addresses this issue and prohibits portfolio investments (Art. 2-
Coverage).115  Hence, it could have no impact on the ASEAN economies.  On the other 
hand, portfolio investments have been fully liberalized in NAFTA under Chapter 11, 
guaranteeing the complete freedom of capital movements.  This is interesting, since the 
other factor of production, labor, was entirely restricted.  
In addition, NAFTA allows freedom of transfer funds (Art. 1109), which makes 
this type of foreign investment more irrelevant to the impact that the inflow of foreign 
capital might have had on Mexico’s development efforts.  Instead, portfolio investments 
might have had a negative impact on Mexico.  For example, some economists, including 
 
115 For a full-text version go to http://www.aseansec.org/7994.pdf.   
Ramirez (2003) and Arroyo Picard et. al. (2003), argue that large capital inflows of so-
called “hot-money” during NAFTA‘s eve and opening might have worsened, if not 
directly caused the Mexican “Tequila/Peso Crisis” of 1995 by flooding the Mexican 
financial system with foreign capital from highly volatile international capital markets. 
 
B). FDI Inflows: In Chapter II (p. 26/34), there were identified four main types of 
FDI which each offer different positive externalities to the host economy.  It was also 
discussed that, historically, most DCs have mainly attracted efficiency-seeking 
investments into low-technology manufacturing sectors (UNCTAD, 1999).  Partially, this 
is due to the fact that most DCs are endowed with large unskilled labor surplus, which 
makes labor cheap and attractive for TNCs.  Also, as explained by Lesher and Miroudot 
(2004), on one hand, the reduction of trade barriers resulting from PTAs reduces market-
seeking or “tariff-jumping” investments from firms characterized by high fixed costs, and 
on the other, this allows efficiency-seeking investments to increase.  Indeed, this pattern 
has taken place in Mexico and in the ASEAN-10 which have mainly attracted efficiency-
seeking FDI to their manufacturing sectors – 62.87% during the period of 1994-2000, and 
34% in the period of 1999-2004 respectively (figure IV.2). 
Figure IV.2. Inward FDI by Sector in Mexico and the ASEAN-10 
 
Mexico 0,37% 1,03% 62,87% 0,90% 12,02% 14,10% 8,71%











    Source:  Author’s adaptation from various sources. (Mexico’s figures are from Arroyo Picard et. al.  
    (2003, p. 47) – 1999-2000.  The ASEAN-10’s figures are from ASEAN Secretariat (2006) – 1999-2004. 
    Note: the high share of investment in Mexico’s financial services includes a one time large investment of  
    US$12.5 billion due to the City Bank’s purchase of Banamex.  
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It was also concluded in Chapter II, that efficiency-seeking investments put at the 
doorstep of the host economy substantial initial benefits according to the level of 
development, but a certain absorbing capacity was necessary to capture such benefits.  
Also, a proactive role of the government was fundamental, not only in order to direct 
FDI, but most importantly, to retain initial investments by constantly stimulating local 
capabilities through policies that involve all local economic agents.  Thus, this subsection 
thoroughly analyzes whether or not Mexico and the ASEAN-10 have been able to benefit 
from the large FDI inflows experienced during their respective accords.      
Although there are controversies about the extent to which NAFTA helped 
Mexico to attract FDI, there is a unanimous consent about the fact that NAFTA has 
favored a net inflow of FDI as opposed to portfolio investments (table IV.1). 
Table IV.1. Mexico’s Total Foreign Investment (in US$ millions) 
   
    Source:  Statistics based on the bank of Mexico presented by Arroyo Picard et. al. (2003, p. 43)  
 
However, despite this positive feature of NAFTA, many studies suggest that 
inward FDI has yet to deliver overall positive effects to the Mexican economy.116  The 
main reason expressed in these studies has to due with the general passive role of the 
Mexican government in directing FDI, in part enforced by the rules and regulations of 
NAFTA’s Chapter 11.  This has created two evident enclave FDI destinations (figure 
IV.3): one, the Federal District (Mexico City), which is by and large historically the most 
vibrant economic area of the country and to which increased FDI comes without surprise; 
                                                 
116 For example, Hufbauer and Schott (2005); UNCTAD (2007b); Ramirez (2003); and Arroyo Picard et. 
al. (2003) to name just a few. 
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and two, the northern part of the country, mainly in the maquiladora sectors, which are 
highly disarticulated from the rest of the economy (Chapter III, p. 61).   





Federal District (Mexico City) Northern States Rest of Mexico 
 
     Source: Adaptation from Arroyo Picard et. al. (2003, p. 50)  
     Notes: 1) Mexico City’s data includes the State of Mexico. 2) 19.35% in the northern sates went to the  
     maquiladora sector.  3) some states in the rest of Mexico such as Chiapas, Oaxaca, Guerrero, Hidalgo  
     and Veracruz (all southern states) accounted only for 0.31 % of all FDI.   
 
Most of the initial FDI projects in the maquiladora sectors were efficiency-
seeking (looking for low-cost labor), which is perfectly normal for DCs according to their 
actual level of domestic capabilities and endowments.  However, in the case of Mexico, 
the two FDI enclaves have not only hardly generated any benefits like forward and 
backward linkages and/or technology spillovers for the rest of the economy, but also have 
largely contributed to the marginalization of other geographical areas and important 
sectors for development.  For example, as reflected in figure IV.3, most rural/agrarian 
central and southern states have received a mere 0.31% of total.  The agricultural sector 
have received 0.37% in the period of 1994-2000, electricity and water sectors received 
0.35%, construction 0.90%, and transport infrastructure 0.52% (figure IV.2).117  
Unfortunately, these areas and sectors have not only been marginalized by foreign 
investors, but they have not received much attention from domestic investments either.   
                                                 




                                                
The second largest recipient sector of inward foreign investment during the period 
of NAFTA in Mexico has been the financial sector, accounting for 14.1% of the total 
(figure IV.2).  However, this has mostly taken place in the form of M&As, which, as 
discussed in Chapter II, generates few benefits for development.   
Furthermore, it is also important to point out the fact that a great part of Mexican 
inward FDI comes from one country, the US.  In fact, the US accounted for 73% of total 
FDI yearend 2000, which means that Mexico suffers a high degree of dependency, not 
only on US economic performance, but also on NAFTA investment provisions.    
Today, Mexico is not only losing old FDI projects to cheaper labor places as well 
as its competitiveness to attract new FDI,118 but it has also been unable to upgrade the 
type of FDI that flows into the economy.  This has been partially due to the 
underutilization119 and low connection of the large FDI inflows during the first years of 
NAFTA, which did not accrue any real dynamic benefits that would upgrade the Mexican 
economy as a whole (Arroyo Picard et. al., 2003).  But most importantly, this clearly 
reflects the total neglect of the government in shaping and overseeing the investment 
dynamics in the country towards meeting its development goals.   
  In contrast, the ASEAN schemes have been, comparatively, more restrictive as 
far as performance requirements and general foreign investor’s concessions.  This has 
allowed, to a certain extent, the respective local governments to play a proactive role in 
directing FDI projects.  For example, the AICO scheme has permitted the ASEAN 
 
118 According to UNCTAD (2006d) figures, Mexico’s FDI inflows have decreased since their pick in 2001 
– about US$27.5 billion, sharply dropping to US$19 billion in 2006.  
 
119 According to FDI Indexes created by UNCTAD, Mexico has been underperforming according to its 
potentials for the past years (http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2468&lang=1# ). 
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governments to strategically direct on average 85% of total inward FDI during the period 
from 1999 to 2006.  That is US$208 billion out US$241 billion, which came on 
“Approval and Appointment Basis” (ASEAN Secretariat, 2005).  Of course, further 
analysis is necessary at the disaggregated level to figure out if these investments went to 
the “right” areas and sectors to avoid enclaves, as it has been the case in Mexico.120  
Perhaps at this point it is also pertinent to briefly take a look at the geographical 
distribution of inward FDI among ASEAN members, which could be of some relevance 
to the individual economic development of each of them.  That is also because any 
aggregate analysis of ASEAN evolvements can be bias when compared to NAFTA.  
Indeed, the geographical distribution of inward FDI in ASEAN is quite uneven with 
countries like Singapore who attract the lion’s share of the total amount (figure IV.4).  
This is certainly not good news for members like Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, which 
so far have been largely left out of picture, receiving a mere 0.7%, 0.2% and 1.6% of the 
total respectively (figure IV.4).  However, as pointed out by Plummer and Cheong (2008, 
p. 6), these countries, and perhaps the entire ASEAN zone, could have been performing 
much worse without Singapore in the field, which serves as both an entrepot center for 
intra-ASEAN trade and a hub for FDI.  Hence, while Singapore apparently does 
extremely well by almost any measure in attracting FDI, its destiny in many ways is 
linked to the economic performance of the region.   
Besides, unlike the marginalized states in Mexico, which have not experienced 
much investment from the enclave FDI areas, the marginalized ASEAN countries such as 
Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia received, in the period of 1995-2000, a very significant 
 
120 Mainly due to data restrictions, such analysis is not provided here.  Few links to some of these data can 
be found at ASEAN Secretariat’s at: http://www.aseansec.org/ .  Also, see Chapter V for few other details.  
part of their total FDI inflows from other ASEAN countries, 28%, 51%, and 20% 
respectively (ASEAN Secretariat, 2005).     







Singapore Malaysia Thailand Vietnam Lao PRD Philippines
Mayanmar Indonesia Cambodia Brunei
  
      Source: ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Statistical Yearbook (2005).   
 
 
There is another aspect of FDI in ASEAN that is important to point out as 
different in comparison to what has been taking place in Mexico.  FDI in ASEAN seems 
to have been occurring in a more “diversified” manner among sectors and among 
industries within sectors.  For instance, although the manufacturing sector in ASEAN has 
received a great part of total inward FDI,  it is no where near the monopolization that has 
taken place in Mexico in this sector, 34% and 62.87% respectively (figure IV.2).  This 
has allowed a greater number of other complementary sectors to internally develop in 
ASEAN.  Moreover, the number of industries involved within the manufacturing sector 
also appears to be more diverse in ASEAN (figure IV.5) than in Mexico, which mostly 
only includes two – autos and electronics. 










Radio, TV & Eqpt Food & Bev. Paper & Prod. Rubber & Prod.
Machinery Metals &Prod. Chimicals &Prod. Petroleum & Prod.
Electric Mach. Wood & Prod.  
   Source: ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Statistical Yearbook (2005).   
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Furthermore, diversification of FDI in ASEAN is not only confined to sectors and 
industries, but it is also present in the very origin of such investments.  Unlike Mexico 
that largely depends on US investment, the ASEAN-10 have been able to keep a constant 
inflow of FDI from countries all over the world, such as Japan, the EU, the US, numerous 
Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs) in Asia including South Korea, Taiwan, and 
Hong Kong, as well as from DCs such as China and India, which although they have 
small shares, still do contribute to the overall diversification of inward FDI (figure IV.6).   










EU-15 All Others India USA China Other EU
Australia Asian NIEs Canada Japan New Zeland ASEAN  
    Source: ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Statistical Yearbook (2005).   
 
According to UNCTAD (2006d), the origin of FDI can be an important 
determinant in attracting FDI, but most importantly, it might also largely influence the 
amount of dynamic benefits that the host economy could derive from such FDI.  For 
example, inward FDI from TNCs from DCs can oftentimes result more beneficial than 
FDI from TNCs from developed countries, mainly because the characteristics of TNCs 
from DCs tend to be more in line with the overall needs of host-DCs, since they come 
from DCs themselves.  This implies a narrower technology gap between host and home 
firms,121 generating easier to absorb technology spillovers.  It could also translate into 
                                                 
121 Aslanoglu, 2000; Kokko, 1996; and Liu et. al., 2000 (in UNCTAD, 2006d, p. 188) concluded that the 
technological gap between home and host firms was successfully closed when it was initially significantly 
small, but when the gap was critically larger, it would widen even further in subsequent years.  (the studies 




                                                
more employment opportunities given the level of skill in DCs122 and greater backward 
and forward linkages with local firms since home and host economic structures are 
similar, and thus, easier to replace home-products with host-economy-products (income 
similarities).  In other words, given the similar economic and business cultures and 
similar production processes, it is more likely that TNCs from DCs, as opposed to the 
ones from developed countries, are more beneficial from a development perspective.  
Hence, because the ASEAN zone has more diversified FDI inflows, with large amounts 
coming from DCs, it could be suggested that the ASEAN-10 might have benefited more 
from inward FDI than Mexico under NAFTA.  It could also further explain the overall 
different impact on development that the ASEAN-10 and Mexico have experienced.           
To sum up, from the discussion in this chapter, a rather evident difference 
emerges in comparing Mexico’s experience under NAFTA’s investment provision and 
the experience of the ASEAN-10 from the ASEAN investment schemes.  That is, given 
the more conservative approach to the overall management of FDI, the ASEAN-10 have, 
at least, been able to maintain some sort of control in directing inward FDI.  Partially, this 
has resulted in a more “diverse” FDI atmosphere as far as distribution and the origin of 
foreign investments is concerned.  This, in turn, allows the local economies to reduce the 
risk of “dependency” on enclave development sectors and economic slowdowns in the 
source of foreign investments.  By the same token, this has increased the possibility of 
capturing a greater part of dynamic gains resulting from different types of FDI, a subject 
that I will briefly discuss in the next chapter.    
 
122 On average per foreign affiliate, UNCTAD (2006d) reports that TNCs from DCs were found to employ 
more local workers – especially in low-skill industries, than those from developed countries for every 
million of US$ spent.  
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CHAPTER V: A BRIEF DEVELOPMENT REVIEW   
 
 
 Many economists have repeatedly stated that it is extremely difficult to 
disentangle the actual effects of PTAs on an economy, for the reason that there are many 
other non-PTA factors and circumstances involved in the changes that the economy 
experiences.123  Hence, by no means, the content of this chapter is to be interpreted as the 
exclusive effect of NAFTA and the ASEAN schemes (AFTA, AIA, and AICO) on 
Mexico’s and the ASEAN-10’s development, respectively.  Nonetheless, it is also 
unrealistic to expect no contributional effect from these agreements on their respective 
economies, since both accords, as discussed in the previous two chapters, have somewhat 
influenced the trade and foreign investment patters of Mexico and the ASEAN-10.   
 By looking at some common indicators based mainly on the discussions in this 
research, this chapter reviews the economic development evolution that Mexico and the 
ASEAN-10 have experienced during their respective PTA era.  However,  I want to 
strongly emphasize that the intent of this chapter, and that of the entire research for that 
matter, is not to present a “quantitative” potential effect of the PTAs discussed here; 
rather, it merely attempts to offer a “qualitative” analysis of what could have happen 




123 See for example, Krueger (1999a); Ramirez (2003); and Baldwin and Venables, 1995 (in Lo Turco 
2003, p. 10).  
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5.1. Mexico’s Economic Development Evolution 
 In January 1st of 1994, NAFTA took full effect as the first agreement of its kind 
involving developed countries and DCs.  Immediately after, as Carlsen (2005) puts it, 
“promoters began to identify it as the project that would usher Mexico into the First 
World, leaving behind decades of intransigent poverty and underdevelopment”.  This was 
despite the fact that in NAFTA’s objectives (Art. 102),124 there is nothing that 
“specifically” refers to the agreement as an instrument to enhance growth and 
development or to achieve income convergence; rather, its main objective was, and 
remains, to exclusively eliminate trade and investment barriers.   
Nonetheless, supporters quickly identified the elimination of tariffs and foreign 
investment regulations as the assurance for Mexico to benefit from increased market 
access and inward foreign investment.  In other words, the long-delayed process of 
economic development could finally take off for Mexico.  Accordingly, several 
judgments were made on the potential impact that NAFTA would have on Mexico’s 
economy.  UNCTAD (2007b, p. 65) presents a summary of these estimates as follows: 
Estimation exercises in the run-up to NAFTA, mostly based on applied 
general equilibrium models, produced various results, depending on the 
methodology and assumptions.  A review of several of these studies by the 
United States Congressional Budget Office (1993) found a consensus that 
NAFTA would produce winners and losers, but a total net gain.  The effects on 
Mexico were expected to be the most substantial, because of its greater trade 
barriers and smaller economy than those of its NAFTA partners.  Most of the 
studies estimated that improved resource allocation as a result of trade 
liberalization under NAFTA would raise Mexico’s GDP, but by less than 1.1%.  
When the effects of economies of scale were included, estimates of the increase 
in Mexico’s GDP ranged from 1.7% to around 3.4%, but they were even much 
higher if investment effects were also considered, ranging from 3.1% to around 
12.7%.  Moreover, according to this review, the most important effect would 
come from productivity growth and technology spillovers.  
 
124 For a full list of NAFTA’s objectives go to: http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/chap-01.asp#A102 .  
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 Furthermore, for Mexico, the biggest winner of the agreement, there were also 
expected large benefits as far as employment and real wages go.  Ramirez (2003) reports 
that, it was expected that as much as a 6.6% increase in employment and a 12% increase 
in real income, or more, by the end of NAFTA’s phased implementation would take 
place.  Moreover, Hufbauer and Schott (2005) point out that Mexican political leaders 
optimistically promised that NAFTA would generate one million new jobs each year and 
begin to address the misery of subsistence labor in rural areas. 
However, comparing the above estimated figures to the actual evolution of the 
Mexican economy during the more than ten years of NAFTA’s implementation, it 
appears that NAFTA has succeeded in meeting its “listed” objectives, increased trade and 
investment flows, but has fallen short in meeting the expectations in other aspects.  
From a traditional Viner’s perspective, NAFTA has mostly resulted in trade 
creation at the aggregate level according to several authors.125  However, at the 
disaggregated level, some studies have found trade diversion in the textile and apparel 
sectors.126  These are interesting findings, especially because Mexico could have largely 
benefited from increased market access in these sectors, in which it enjoyed a 
comparative advantage.  It appears that Mexico ended up on the “losing” side in this case, 
mainly due to NAFTA’s restrictive RoO (Chapter III, p. 54).        
However, as I have argued previously, this paper is not concerned with the 
“static” outcome of PTAs.  Rather, it takes a dynamic approach, observing other potential 
 
125 See for example, Krueger (1999b); Soloaga and Winters, 2001; Gould, 1998; and World Bank, 2003 (in 
Lesher and Miroudot, 2005, p. 31).   
 
126 See for example, ITC, 1997; Fukao, Okubo and Stern, 2003 (in Lesher and Miroudot, 2005, p. 31), and 
more recently, Cadot et. al. (2005).   
 101
                                                
benefits that might have resulted from market access and inward foreign investment, 
which presumably have both increased (figures III.1, III.2 and IV.1).  Hence, it is only 
adequate to analyze the dynamic gains that might have matured to Mexico, namely 
physical capital formation and economic activity, employment and wages, technological 
spillovers, and human capital and skill enhancement.  
First, in Chapter II (p. 28), it was concluded that a PTA enlarges the market, and 
so, it presents the opportunity to generate physical capital formation and economic 
activity from exploiting economies of scale and productivity gains.  However, given the 
discussion in Chapter III, this opportunity was largely reduced in Mexico simply because 
there was very little actual market access, despite the significant increased in export-
flows.  In part, this was due to NAFTA’s overall structure and restrictive RoO, but it was 
also largely due to consumption patterns differences in NAFTA as well as Mexico’s 
supply capacity constraints.   
Foreign investment should have also contributed to physical capital formation and 
economic activity, since FDI tremendously increased (figure IV.1).  However, also due in 
part to the unrestrictive NAFTA’s investment provisions that were given to foreign 
investors (Chapter IV, p. 84), the Mexican government’s ability to direct it towards its 
development goals was largely reduced.  This resulted on enclave FDI destinations, areas 
and sectors, highly disarticulated from the rest of the economy (figures IV.2 and IV.3) 
and on large capital flights due to “transfer-pricing”.127  As a result, gross fixed capital 
formation (GFCF) as a share of GDP has remained at around 20%, which is below the 
 
127 Ramirez (2003) reports that remittances of profits and dividends more than double between 1990 and 
2000, going from US$2.3 to US$5.2 billion, or 55.6% in average of the FDI inflows.  
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25% level generally understood to be required for a sustained process of catch-up growth 
in a middle-income country such as Mexico (UNCTAD, 2007b). 
Second, as presumed by NAFTA promoters and concluded in Chapter II (p. 29), 
the agreement should have resulted on more and better paid jobs.  However, in reality, as 
Ramirez (2003) puts it, employment growth and real wages in Mexico during NAFTA 
have been lackluster at best and disastrous at worse (see figure V.1).  Some recent 
statistics (based on “official” unemployment) have tried to show the positive impact that 
NAFTA has had on Mexico’s unemployment, which has dropped from 6.4% in 1995 to 
almost a constant level between 2.5% and 3.0% thereafter (Ramirez, 2003).128  But even 
the Mexican government has admitted the low reliability of these measures due to the 
large informal employment sector that currently accounts for almost one third of the 
Mexican labor force (ibid).  Indeed, many argue that a better measure for Mexico’s 
unemployment rate must include the underemployed labor force, which has remained 
constant, or even increased, during the NAFTA period – at around 20%.   
There were jobs created during the first years of NAFTA, which resulted in a 
1.2% annual growth rate, but that was well below the 2.5% needed to absorb the yearly 
1.2-1.5 million new entrants (Ramirez, 2003).  After 2000, however, in part due to the 
2001 US recession, and in part due to China’s competition after its WTO accession, job 
creation has decreased even in the most vibrant sector, the maquiladora plants, which 
have been directly impacted by NAFTA factors.  This is in spite of 45% productivity 
increase on average (figure V.1).  Moreover, Arroyo Picard et. al. (2003) point out that 
NAFTA jobs have not been good jobs.  They have been low paying jobs without any 
 
128 See also Sàinz, 2006 (in UNCTAD, 2007b, p. 77).   
 
basic benefits.  Likewise, the performance of real wages has not been the exception.  
There has been a steady erosion of purchasing power of both minimum and average 
wages in the ‘90s, loosing 23% of its value between 1993 and 1999 (Ramirez, 2003).     



































Productivity Employment Real Wages Labor Cost (DLS)
 
    Source: Adapted from Arroyo Picard et. al. (2003, p. 65) 
 
Thirdly, as discussed in Chapter II (p. 30), technology upgrading is perhaps the 
most important factor of growth in today’s highly technological world.  Hence, benefiting 
in this area might have been one of Mexico’s greatest gains from increasing trade and 
investment activity with two of the world’s top innovators.  Unfortunately, measuring 
technological spillovers resulting from a PTA is not a simple task.  Nonetheless, some 
authors such as Lall (2000b) have attempted to do so, by analyzing the evolution of the 
technology embedded in traded goods.  
UNCTAD (2007b) takes the same approach in the case of Mexico during 
NAFTA. This study points out that a large part of Mexican exports during NAFTA have 
been high skill and technologically advanced products.129  However, this does not imply 
that Mexican production systems have been upgraded, for that high-technology products 
may result from low-technology processes.  This is because the large bulk of imports to 
Mexico are already high skilled and technologically advanced products, allowing mere 
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129 UNCTAD (2007b, p. 73) reports that only 17% of manufactured Mexican exports are characterized by 
low-skill-technology.  
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assembly activities with low skill and technological content to take place in the Mexican 
side of the border.  This suggests, as UNCTAD (2007b) further argues, a relatively 
insignificant change in the technological base of Mexico.  Rather, Mexico has been 
locked-in in the exploitation of its initial comparative advantage, low-cost and abundant 
labor.  Partially, as previously discussed, all this can be attributed to factors such as 
NAFTA’s overall trade and investment design as well as its restrictive IPR package, 
Mexico’s low absorbing capacity, and most importantly, to the overall passive role of the 
government in the process.    
Lastly, NAFTA could have contributed to Mexico’s human capital and skill 
enhancement (Chapter II, p. 32).  However, this is still a mere theoretical argument quite 
difficult to put into practice because an extensive package of domestic policies and an 
active role of local agents are both required (Lee, 2005).  Besides, these benefits are not 
easy to be captured and measured.  Nonetheless, some insights (non-NAFTA related) can 
highlight how much Mexico could have benefited from NAFTA in this area.  For 
example, one could look at the Human Development Index (HDI), before and during 
NAFTA, (see figure V.2).  But although it shows a gradual improvement, it leaves the 
open question of what would have happened had Mexico invested more on education.130  
Moreover, some studies in Miyamoto (2003, p. 29) show that only 11% of TNCs in 
Mexico invested in in-house training compared to figures ranging from 65 to 75% in 
other countries such as the Philippines, Singapore, and China.           
 
130 Compared to US and Canada, Mexico still lags largely behind as far as years of schooling and 
expenditure on education per inhabitant, demonstrating Mexico’s workers level of skill compared to that of 
its NAFTA partners. Guisan et. al. (2003, p. 7) report that in average during the period of 1995-99 the years 
of schooling in Mexico were at 6.55 compared to 12.21 in the US.  Moreover, Mexico spent US$500 per 
year (at 1999 prices and PPPs), which is less than a third of that in the US. 
 























      Source: Author’s creation from: UNDP (2007).  
 
To sum up, Mexico could have largely benefited from NAFTA as it was predicted 
by both trade theory and estimates in the run-up, but unfortunately due to all the 
circumstances discussed throughout this thesis, the overall positive effect has been quite 
modest and even negative in some instances.131  Not only the Mexican economy did not 
grow anywhere close to the 12.7% predicted by some estimates above, but it actually has 
performed worse than in previous periods (figure V.3).  Moreover, as Arroyo Picard et. 
al. (2003) point out, during NAFTA, GDP per capita growth in Mexico has being at the 
second lowest level during its the entire modern history since the 1930’s with the 
exception of the 1982 crisis (figure V.4).132  In short, in describing NAFTA’s impact on 
Mexico, an anecdotal medical proverb comes to mind: “the surgery was successful, but 
the patient died”.  In the sense that NAFTA succeeded in doing what it was set out to do, 
it increased trade and foreign investment flows, but Mexico did not ultimately succeed in 
kicking off its economic development process.   
 
 
                                                 
131 Several studies support this argument; see for example, Arroyo Picard et. al. (2003); Ramirez, (2003); 
UNCTAD, (2007b), which in p.67 lists numerous other studies, such as Moreno-Brid, Ruiz Nàpoles and 
Rivas Valdivia, 2005, Hufbauer and Scott, 2005, Blecker, 2003, and Audley et. al. 2003.  
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132 See the cited authors for a more detailed discussion of Mexico’s GDP per capita growth, before and 
during the years of NAFTA.  See also Figure V.8, which is based on UNCTAD data, reflecting similar 
trends, and also compares Mexico’s figures with that of the ASEAN-10. 






1970 - 1980 1970 - 1989 1980 - 1989 1992 - 2000 2000 - 2005
    
    Source: Author’s Creation with data from UNCTAD (2006a).  
 














    Source:  Adopted from Arroyo Picard et. al. (2003, p. 10).  
 
5.2. ASEAN-10’s Economic Development Evolution            
 As mentioned before, disentangling the effects of trade and investment schemes 
on economies can be a very challenging task.  Indeed, this has been the case of NAFTA’s 
impact on Mexico, which, to a certain extent, has been a more evident process, providing 
more available data.  What this means is that at least NAFTA was implemented all at 
once in a single package.  Hence, proving a “reliable” assessment of the impact that the 
ASEAN schemes have had on the economic development of the economies involved, 
which among other factors, entered at different times into the agreements can be an 
almost impossible endeavor.  Nonetheless, mainly following the above structure on 
NAFTA’s impact on Mexico, this section attempts to provide some insights that may 
loosely reflect ASEAN schemes’ impact on the ASEAN-10. 
ASEAN (as whole) has been a long-lived association mainly born out political 
tensions among countries in Southeast Asia, and it has been subject to continuous (up to 
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date) modifications.133  Although, “the acceleration of economic growth and social 
progress” is explicitly listed as the first objective of the agreement,134 ASEAN neglected 
economic cooperation for the first 25 years of its existence while it mainly concentrated 
on its second objective – “to promote regional peace and stability” (Cuyvers and 
Pupphavesa, 1996). Unlike Mexico in NAFTA, which place all its development affords at 
once on the NAFTA project, the ASEAN members have taken the time to understand the 
potentials of regional integration and have also diversified their development projects in 
many different unilateral initiatives.   
The slow progress of ASEAN integration, as pointed out in Cuyvers and 
Pupphavesa (1996), has been justified due to the fact that, at the early stages, the country 
members were hardly, if at all, complementary economies.  They all followed widely 
different development strategies, from free trade in Singapore, to export promotion in 
Thailand and Malaysia and import substitution in Indonesia and the Philippines.  ASEAN 
had to wait until the liberalization policies in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand in the second half of the 1980s, to find the economic policy priorities between 
the ASEAN-countries as sufficiently converged in order to allow for the next steps in 
economic cooperation.  Something that was not seen at all in the case of the NAFTA 
members, which engaged immediately in a reciprocal economic cooperation despite of 
the asymmetries between Mexico and the other members.      
 
133 It has increased the number of members from 5 to 10; it has formed various schemes, among them a 
PTA in 1977, and several projects for industrial cooperation such as AIP, AIC, and AIJV, culminating with 
the formation of AFTA, AIA, and AICO during the ‘90s.  Moreover, ASEAN has stated talks about 
creating European Union like bloc by the year 2020 – the ASEAN Economic Community (see Shimizu, 
2007 for further discussion) (also see Chapter III).  
 
134 For an original version of ASEAN objectives go to: http://www.aseansec.org/1212.htm
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Substantial economic integration among ASEAN members occurred until 1992 
with the formation of AFTA.  Like NAFTA, the main objectives of this FTA were to 
liberalize trade and stimulate foreign investment in the region.  In addition, ASEAN 
members created other schemes (AIA and AICO) in order to further attract foreign 
investment (Chapter IV).  But unlike NAFTA, these schemes were much less identified 
as projects that would bring the ASEAN-10 out of their developing country status.     
ASEAN Schemes were not preceded by any “number-crunching”.  As Cuyvers 
and Pupphavesa (1996) put it, the mood was to: “Agree First, Talk Later”.  However, the 
few estimation studies of the economic (static) impact on the ASEAN economies 
generally expressed an insignificant effect, mainly among other reasons due to the 
relative similar factor endowments, low trade patterns among members, and to the overall 
characteristics embraced in a S-S PTA as discussed in Chapter I.  The main prediction 
was that AFTA would mostly result on trade diversion,135 and AIA and AICO would 
have a trivial impact on inward foreign investments.      
The actual outcomes have been tested by several authors with a quite mixed set of 
results.  For example, Hapsari and Mangunsong (2006), using gravity models, conclude 
that AFTA overall has been a trade-diverting agreement.  However, Cernat (2003), also 
using gravity models, concludes that AFTA has been one of the best performing current 
S-S PTAs, resulting in trade creation, despite of its slow process of integration.  Yet, 
other studies, such as those done by Hakim (2004) and Tho (2002), conclude that at the 
disaggregated level (countries instead of sectors), AFTA has resulted in trade creation for 
 
135 For example, Cuyvers and Pupphavesa (1996, p. 11) cite studies, such as Nadal De Simone (1996: 106) 
and Chirathivat (1996: 29), which calculated that trade liberalization under AFTA will induce for the 
ASEAN countries hardly 3 o 4 billion US dollars, and mainly result on trade diversion.  
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some members and trade diversion for others but overall trade creation with the rest of 
the world.136  In addition, as highlighted in chapters III and IV, there are studies that have 
tested the actual efficiency of the ASEAN schemes in meeting their initial goals, which 
were to increase trade and inward foreign investment.  One example is Elliot and 
Ikemoto, 2004 (in Lendle, 2007, p. 6), which suggests that AFTA had no impact on intra-
ASEAN trade.137  In regards to foreign investment, Plummer and Cheong (2008) 
conclude that AIA in particular has had an overall positive impact on intra-ASEAN FDI 
flows, but it has not have any impact on extra-ASEAN flows.        
Again, this research is not as concerned with the static outcomes of PTAs as it is 
on the dynamic benefits that can be obtained from them.  Indeed, supporters of the 
ASEAN schemes, especially AFTA, vindicated that the real benefits were be obtained 
from the dynamic effects on economic growth, as pointed out by Cuyvers and 
Pupphavesa (1996, p. 11), who refer to studies such as Yap and Edillon (1993), Imada 
(1993), and Ramasamy (1994 and 1995).  Therefore, below I will present a brief review 
of the potential dynamic gains that the ASEAN-10 could have accrued. 
First of all, because AIA reserves the right to restrict transfer-pricing if it deems 
necessary (Chapter IV, p. 80), it could be expected that the ASEAN-10 would have 
gained more from inward FDI, not only to accumulate physical capital, but also to reduce 
financial instability during the time of crisis, thereby preventing large capital flights.  As 
a matter of fact, this right has been evoked by Malaysia during the Asian Crisis of 1997 
 
136 Note that most of these studies confined their research, mainly for data restrictions, to the five largest 
members of ASEAN (Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines).  
 
137 Lendle (2007, p. 6) suggests that this is not very surprising given the evidence for low tariff utilization 
rates.  He refers to empirical evidence (p.9) from Baldwin (2006), who reports that, for example, utilization 
rates in 2002 have only been 4% for Malaysia and 11% for Thailand.   
(UNCTAD, 2007b).  Another factor that could have influenced the retention of inward-
FDI and eventually convert it into physical capital is the fact that foreign invertors in the 
ASEAN zone are much more diversified, coming from both developed and DCs (Chapter 
IV).138  However, figure V.5 reflects a different story, mainly for Thailand and Indonesia, 
but it also seems to have had some positive influence on Cambodia and Vietnam.  Of 
course, this data is a mere illustration of the physical capital formation trends that have 
been taking place in ASEAN, and it is not to be interpreted as a result of PTA 
envelopments in the area.  Rather, other factors such as the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
could have had a real direct impact.    
Figure V.5. Gross Capital Formation Trends in the ASEAN-10. 
 
1990 8,30% 30,70% 32,40% 13,40% 24,20% 37,10% 41,40% 12,60%
2000 16,90% 22,20% 27,30% 12,00% 21,20% 33,30% 22,80% 29,60%
Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam 
 
     Source: Author’s creation with data from UCTAD (2006d).  
 
Secondly, it appears that the effect of any aspect of economic integration and/or 
PTAs on employment is still mostly a theoretical argument.  At least, specific studies at 
the disaggregated-sector and subgroup level are needed to capture the dynamic impact 
that a particular PTA could have on employment and wages, as Jansen and Lee (2007) 
argued.  Several studies have been undertaken in the case of NAFTA and its impact on 
Mexico’s employment.  However, this is not the case, to my knowledge, in the ASEAN 
countries.  Therefore, my discussion in this respect will be limited to observe the 
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138 UNCTAD (2006d) reports that, in average during the ‘90s TNCs from developed countries have tended 
to repatriate a larger portion of their profits (50 to 60%) than TNCs from DCs, which suggests that TNCs 
from DCs reinvested more of their profits in the local economy, increasing the opportunity to increment 
total physical capital formation for the host economy.  
“official” unemployment trends in the ASEAN-10 during the period of AFTA (table 
V.1).  From observing table V.1, can be concluded that AFTA did not have any particular 
positive impact on the ASEAN-10 employment levels.  Rather, it seems that it has 
negatively affected some countries such as the Philippines, and Indonesia.  Note also, 
however, that the figures below might be even worse if rural and disguised 
unemployment as well as underemployment are included as in the case of Mexico.  
Nonetheless, ASEAN authorities have identified and recognized this social problem and 
have started regional cooperation in tackling the existent high unemployment level along 
with the process of economic integration.139      
Table V.1. Unemployment Rate in ASEAN-10 
   
     Source:  ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Statistical Yearbook (2005).  
 
Thirdly,  as in the case of Mexico, assessing how much the ASEAN-10 have 
benefited from technology spillovers resulting from increased trade and inward FDI can 
be proven quite challenging.  Nonetheless, there are some differences between NAFTA’s 
FDI regulations and the ASEAN schemes, especially AICO, that might suggest that the 
ASEAN countries could have gained more in this area.  First, the approach to IPR 
regulation in ASEAN has been more relaxed than in the case of NAFTA, which can be 
                                                 
139 See for example, the various initiatives started in 2006 by ASEAN authorities, aiming at improving 
social problems in ASEAN, such as poverty and unemployment (http://www.aseansec.org/21009.htm). 
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proven to be beneficial for the technology upgrading of the ASEAN-10 given their level 
of economic development (Chapter IV, p. 80-81).140  Second, and certainly more 
important, the set up of the AICO scheme has allowed the ASEAN-10 to have some sort 
of policy space to strategically direct inward FDI projects.  This is because it requires 
foreign investors to engage in some sort of “sharing”, including technology, creating a 
more “restrictive” regime for foreign investors as far as performance requirements and 
local content usage (Chapter IV, p. 93).  As such, AICO has “required” TNCs to form a 
more interactive atmosphere with local firms, increasing the potential for technology 
transfers and diffusion.141
Contrary to the believe that restrictive FDI regimes discourage foreign investors, 
recent statistics show that many TNCs, mainly auto-makers such as Toyota, Honda, 
Nissan, and other US and European firms, have shown tremendous interest on the AICO 
projects.  Shimizu (2007) reports that, by July 2006, there were 141 approved AICO 
ventures, generating US$1.7 billion in traded goods.  Moreover, 150 applications, from 
American companies alone, are been currently processed (US-ASEAN Business Council, 
2008).  These projects have enabled the ASEAN-zone to emerge as an important player 
in the auto industry, not only in the production of foreign brands, but also, progressively, 
in the production of home-grown brands.  For example, Shimizu (2007, p. 84) documents 
that Toyota has began to produce a strategic world car: the Innovative International 
Multipurpose Vehicle (IMV) in Thailand for the first time in the world in August 2004, 
which hardly depends on Japanese parts, and it is not based on any Japan-made model.    
 
140 See Lall and Albaladejo (2002) for a detailed discussion on IPR and the level of development.  
 
141 UNCTAD (2006d, p. 187) reports that 33% of TNCs in Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, 
and Thailand sourced from local inputs, compared to a mere 1-3% in Mexico.  
Although this project has been mainly concentrated in Thailand, it has created a 
wide intra-regional production network, which mainly sources from other ASEAN 
countries that complement the production chain (ibid).  Hence, it could be loosely 
concluded that the ASEAN schemes have contributed somewhat to the overall ASEAN 
technology base, something that has hardly occurred in the case of Mexico.  
Lastly, the ASEAN-10 could have also benefited from increased trade and inward 
FDI in the area of human capital and skill enhancement, but as I already mentioned, it is 
quite difficult to capture and measure such benefits.  As in the case of Mexico, the HDI in 
the ASEAN-10 seems to have been gradually improving without any important variations 
during the period of all the ASEAN schemes (figure V.6).  But again, is quite irrelevant 
to base any judgments on this index.  Rather, some other observations can provide better 
insights of how the ASEAN-10 have been evolving in this area in order to be able to 
capture a greater part of the benefits potentially provided.  Also, it is important to point 
out the wide differences in the overall level of education and skill available among 
ASEAN members.  This could have resulted on a biased distribution of this type of 
dynamic gains from economic regional integration. 
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  Source: Author’s creation with data from: UNDP (2007).  
 
Nonetheless, the ASEAN members have associated efforts in diverse areas that 
can improve the human capital stock of the entire zone allowing for an increase in the 
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absorbing capacity of all members.  For example, there has been created an ASEAN 
University Network, promoting general education in the fields of science and technology.  
Also, aggregate cooperation has emerged in the areas of health and nutrition, culture and 
information, drugs and narcotics, and disaster management, among others (ASEAN 
Secretariat, 2007b).142  Unfortunately, the same developments have not been seen in the 
case of NAFTA, where “deep-integration” has not gone beyond exploiting trade and 
investment opportunities.   
To sum up, despite some of the difficulties encountered in pointing out the 
dynamic benefits that the ASEAN-10 could have obtained from engaging in their 
respective trade and investment schemes and the overall mixed results from static 
models, it seems that, at the aggregate level the ASEAN-10 have somewhat largely 
benefited from AFTA, AIA, and AICO as far as pure economic performance is 
concerned.  This is reflected on their relatively high constant annual GDP growth rates, 
before and during the period of these schemes (figure V.7).  Although the five largest 
members, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, were severely 
hit by the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, they were able to bounce back after the year 2000.  
On the other hand, the ASEAN schemes seem to have paid extremely well to the late 
ASEAN joiners, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam, hitting record high 
growth rates since their ASEAN membership (figure V.7).   
Moreover, GDP per capita growth appears to have evolved in the same matter as 
GDP growth for all members (figure V.8).  It slightly dropped during the 1997 Crisis for 
the founding members, but recuperated immediately after.  And, it has been sharply 
 
142 For further information on these developments go to: http://www.aseansec.org/8558.htm.  
increasing for the late ASEAN comers (BCLMV) at impressive rates right after their 
membership into ASEAN, going from an annual growth rate of mere 0.66% during the 
‘70s and ’80 to an aggregate 5.88% during the period of 2000 and 2005 (figure V.8).  
Have the developments of economic integration in the ASEAN contributed to this?  This 
is perhaps an interesting subject for further and more detailed research.  However, one 
thing seems to be quite evident.  There have been important differences in the way in 
which economic integration is taking place in Southeast Asia and in North America that 
might have had a significant impact on the development of the DCs involved, which can 
be reflected on the final overall economic performance of Mexico and the ASEAN-10.  
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   Source: Author’s Creation with data from UNCTAD (2006a).  
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It is hoped that the main conclusions have already been drawn and understood 
from the various discussions throughout the corpus of this research.  However, there are a 
few points that I would like to highlight in this concluding section by way of 
summarizing the main ideas embedded in this thesis. 
First, it is granted that economic integration can be conducive to development. 
Thus, the fact that many DCs have engaged in “integration agreements” may well result 
in speedier development.  However, it has also been noted that external integration has to 
synergize with an intensive process of internal integration if benefits are to be reaped. 
This is where it is important to remember that whether development would indeed 
materialize depends on the content of whatever integration agreement that is reached and 
the relative state of development of each of the signatories to the agreement (the latter 
consideration of which may shape the content of an agreement more in favor to some). 
The state of development of each country at any time is the cumulative result of the 
historical interactions of both internal and external economic (and in many cases, social) 
forces.  The content of any integration agreement in some sense defines how the external 
forces would either support or obstruct the forces of internal integration when the 
agreement is implemented, and thus would shape the future path and trajectory of 
development of the countries concerned. 
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Indeed, and this second point follows directly from the first, in analyzing two 
current PTAs, NAFTA and ASEAN, this research has shown how important it is to 
examine the content of each PTA.  Thus, while they do involve the conventional “market 
access” issues (Chapter III), they also cover, among other channels of integration, 
international investment (Chapter IV).  More fundamentally, the close scrutiny in those 
chapters indicate that the relative bargaining power (which partly reflect the relative state 
of development) and the general structural asymmetries among different members shape 
the overall “integration intention” of each agreement, and thus result in differing 
“readiness” of each member to benefit from the opportunities presented. 
These considerations have without a doubt played a crucial role in the 
developmental effects that NAFTA has had on Mexico thus far, in which integration has 
not gone beyond the mere exploitation of trade and investment opportunities by the 
stronger players in the field.  On the other hand, the process of integration in Southeast 
Asia, although slow, has been taking a more development-friendly approach.  This is not 
only because many of the aspects present in NAFTA were not of much concern in 
ASEAN, but also because ASEAN has been designed to ultimately embrace other 
important development aspects of economic integration and collectively address them. 
The second point above is a sad reminder, and here is my third point, that the 
current available theories on which most assessments of PTAs are based, traditional trade 
theories, unfortunately contain serious short comings.  They largely omit from the 
analysis or simply take for granted many the other aspects of economic integration 
essential for growth and development.  Consequently, misleading conclusions are 
presented concerning the potential benefits of forming a PTA, and the form and design 
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they should take in order to spur the development process of the DCs involved in such 
schemes.  Also, it is important to highlight that these theories are based on very shaky 
grounds and lack conclusive empirical support (Deraniyagala and Fine, 2001). 
Fourth, it is also necessary to stress the fact that this comparative analysis has not 
attempted to present a “quantitative” assessment of the PTAs studied here.  Rather, it has 
taken a “qualitative” approach, considering other aspects of economic integration 
typically excluded from conventional thinking.  Indeed, given the shortsighted approach 
of traditional trade theories, an increasing body of literature is diverting from their 
postulates.143  Unlike orthodox evaluations that can result in different outcomes from the 
same subject of study (a certain PTA) because the use of different data sets, assumptions, 
and interpretations of the results, the overall message from this new emerging literature 
unanimously echoes the results obtained in this research.  That is, N-S PTAs can be 
beneficial for development, but given the many differences among members, the benefits 
can be unequally distributed.  On the other hand, in S-S PTAs, although there is low 
potential for large benefits, the few benefits generated can be more equally distributed 
among members. At least, the costs of trade and investment liberalization can be reduced. 
Nonetheless, there is still a large untapped field for further “alternative” analysis 
of PTAs in many other areas that were not covered in this research, for example, the 
impact of foreign competition, the potential benefits that can be drawn from truly 
liberalizing all production factors, such as labor and not only trade and capital.  But most 
importantly, future research in the area of economic integration must move away from 
 




orthodox analysis into more dynamic and realistic consideration of many other variables 
and circumstances that can offer reliable information to DCs in meeting their 
developmental goals when engaging in a PTA.  Ultimately, this alternative research could 
also provide valuable insights to ensure that DCs actually benefit from trade and 
investment negotiations at the multilateral level like the so-called “Development Round” 
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